

THE WORLD AFTER THE PEACE CONFERENCE

BEING AN EPILOGUE TO THE 'HISTORY OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS' AND A PRÓLOGUE
TO THE 'SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
1920-1923'

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Ἐδοξε δέχεσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰ τεῖχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ'
αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ
Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.—XENOPHON, *Hellenica*, II, ii, 22-3.

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PREFACE

THIS book was originally written as an introduction to the *Survey of International Affairs in 1920-3*, and was intended for publication as part of the same volume; but both parts grew in the making until it became necessary to divide them into the two separate volumes which are now being published simultaneously by the Oxford University Press. The number of important events which crowded the years covered by the *Survey* made the compression of that volume within the limits originally laid down an impossibility, while, at the same time, those responsible for the whole publication felt that Mr. Toynbee's introduction was far too valuable to the student of post-war history to be suppressed or even curtailed. Adrift on the vast and shifting sea of facts and allegations of which this period consists, the explorer needs some chart of the *terra firma* of previous history, from the—comparatively—fixed points of which he may take his bearings and establish his position. Such a chart the present volume will, it is hoped, be found to provide; but, like a chart, it is an independent piece of work, complete in itself, and capable, therefore, of being severed from the context with which it was originally associated.

While it is anticipated that most readers will not rest content with the introductory volume only, it is possible that some may be found whose ambitions go no farther than to desire a sound and impartial historical orientation in the troubled era in which they are compelled to live, and to such this comparatively short, but at the same time penetrating, review may be more welcome in its present form than as part of a larger, and, in the alternative shape, decidedly more unwieldy whole.

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MAP

The World on Mollweide's Projection.

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‘There is no doubt that Mankind is once more on the move. The very foundations have been shaken and loosened, and things are again fluid. The tents have been struck, and the great caravan of Humanity is once more on the march.’—GENERAL SMUTS, 16th December, 1918.

(i) The Movement of History

ON the 10th January, 1920, the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was completed in Paris, and six days later the Council of the League of Nations held its first meeting in the same city. In that month, therefore, the state of war between the Allies and Germany officially¹ came to an end, while a new experiment in co-operation between sovereign states for the maintenance of peace was brought into operation. A moment had thus arrived to which the peoples of all the belligerent countries (and, indeed, the whole of Mankind, since all had been affected by the War in some degree) had been looking forward with intense expectation. The vanquished might dread the prospect; the victors might welcome it; the neutrals might be divided in their sympathies; but almost all would have agreed, at that moment, that the termination of the Peace Conference would mark a greater epoch in the history of the world than the outbreak of the War.

This expectation was falsified because it overlooked the prevailing psychological conditions, which appear in retrospect to have been unfavourable to any sudden creative achievement. Hostilities had ended abruptly after more than four years of growing nervous tension; the crisis of the struggle had occurred immediately before the end; and the *dénouement* had been a reversal of fortune which was almost without precedent in military history. All parties had been penetrated by the war spirit to the utmost degree by the date at which the Peace Conference assembled, and the two opposing groups had been thrown off their balance to an almost equal extent by the shock of overwhelming victory and defeat. Apart, however,

¹ The Treaty had been signed at Versailles by the plenipotentiaries on the 28th June, 1919, and the Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany on the 11th November, 1918.

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from the particular *dénouement*, the outlook of war-time was in itself adverse to the prospects of an immediate settlement on a stable basis, for the military necessities of improvisation and extravagance discourage the qualities required for negotiating or even for dictating a constructive peace.

Before these qualities could reassert themselves in the counsels of the Governments there had to be a gradual revaluation of war-time into peace-time values in the minds of the peoples ; and the first popular movements in this direction made for chaos and not for order, because they were essentially irrational. The Armistice had no sooner been announced than an irresistible impulse to throw off the yoke and to escape began to make itself manifest among the populations of the belligerent countries. So long as their communities had been in palpable and imminent danger, the herd instinct had stimulated most individuals to abnormal exertion and abnormal self-repression. With the sudden removal of the stimulus a correspondingly violent reaction set in ; and the horror of the War at first sought purely negative relief in an impulse to sweep away the abnormal phenomena of the War as such, without considering whether a mere void would be the best foundation for reconstruction. This demand for 'demobilization' in every sphere was so strong that even the victorious Governments were carried along by the tide, and the statesmen at Paris had hardly begun to grapple with their task before they found their omnipotence ebbing away. They were compelled to sacrifice future good in order to avoid present evil, to improvise instead of laying solid foundations, to take *ad hoc* decisions, to devote a large part of their energies to ephemeral but crucial problems, and to put aside as irrelevant such problems as were not of immediate practical importance. This was not a moral failure so much as a hard necessity, which impressed itself, from the Supreme Council downwards, upon the subordinate members of the respective delegations. The presence of this *force majeure* declares itself throughout the six volumes of the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, which were largely written by persons who had themselves taken part in the activities there recorded. The following passage may serve as an illustration :

The great and absorbing preoccupation of a Peace Conference is, or ought to be, to make peace. Until peace is made, the state of war continues ; an armistice is not peace ; and every day that the state of war continues is an untold misfortune to all concerned, even though fighting has ceased. The urgent necessity is to bind up the severed ties, to set going once more the current of life between countries, which

was blocked by the war, and to do it as quickly as possible. It is necessary to insist on this truism, because it is so apt to be forgotten by brilliant and inventive critics. A Conference must aim at the possible, not the ideal. Otherwise, it will dissolve in long academic discussions, and lose sight of its practical object. It is fatal for it to be ambitious. If it can make peace quickly, and at the same time do nothing to prevent future development on sound lines, it has done a very great deal, and as much as can be expected of it. Some people expect too much of a Conference, and bitter disappointment is the inevitable result. In matters financial and economic there is no finality. Boundaries can be fixed, and if they are rightly fixed can be expected to endure for a considerable period, and to become part of the permanent framework of nations. Even if the boundaries are badly drawn, it often happens that they become accepted. But economic and financial relations cannot be fixed with the same definiteness and permanence. They are constantly growing or changing. No treaty which deals with such matters can do more than mark a certain stage, adjust difficulties which have already arisen, and give a fair opportunity to the future to develop on good lines.¹

These observations, which refer in their original context to the financial clauses of the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, would apply equally well to the Reparation Chapter in the Treaty of Versailles—at once the most important and the least conclusive piece of work which the Peace Conference left behind it. The legacy of this one chapter, during the four years beginning from the date at which the Versailles Treaty came into force, fills many pages of narrative in the following volume,² and almost every chapter in each of the Peace Treaties has contributed its tale of new problems and unexpected situations. The portentous forces set in motion by the War of 1914 could no more be arrested by the summary method of drafting a treaty than the Hydra could be killed by a stroke of the sword, and the weary statesmen of Europe saw two heads spring up for every head which they cut off. Moreover, there were great regions of the world—such as the Far East and the American Continent—which the Peace Treaties barely touched and where the movement of international affairs continued almost unbroken; and there was the League of Nations, which came into operation on the 10th January, 1920, for the express purpose of building up a new system of international relations. Thus the world went on its way; but, before attempting to trace the course

¹ *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley and published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs, hereafter quoted as *H. P. C.* The present quotation is from vol. v, pp. 19–20.

² See the *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–3*, II (iv).

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of international affairs in detail during the four years which followed, it is necessary to make some survey of the world as it was immediately before the outbreak of War and immediately after the peace settlement.

(ii) The Political Map in 1914

Although a number of lesser states preserved their neutrality throughout the War of 1914, it was none the less a 'general war' in the sense that, before it drew to a close, it had involved every one of the Great Powers existing at the time of its outbreak.

A Great Power may be defined as a political force exerting an effect co-extensive with the widest range of the society in which it operates. The Great Powers of 1914 were 'world-powers' because Western society had recently become world-wide; but at the same time they were the local sovereigns of limited (though in some cases enormous) territories, from which their strength in population and resources was drawn. This embodiment of the Great Powers of modern Western society in local territorial states was such a familiar fact in the political environment that it was commonly assumed to be a permanent and inevitable phenomenon. In reality, however, the type of territorial Great Power to which the protagonists in the War of 1914 belonged did not emerge, in the West, before that phase of its history which opened towards the year 1475 of the Christian era. The Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire were the only Great Powers in medieval Western Europe, and these did not depend upon their territorial basis for the force which they alone were able to exert upon the entire body of Western Christendom. In extent of local sovereignty, they were frequently surpassed by states which possessed no such general influence as theirs upon Western affairs; but most medieval states lived their lives in isolation or only entered into relations with a restricted circle of neighbours, and although Western Europe constituted a single society then as now, the local political authorities (none of whom were fully 'sovereign' in the later Western sense) were not the forces which held that society together.

It is true that, in medieval Western Europe, society was already regarded as a 'comity of nations', and that, then as afterwards, the term 'nation' connoted a common country, a common language, a common tradition, or some combination of these three elements. On the other hand, the later political connotation of the term was

markedly absent ; and if an educated medieval westerner had been asked what was the first association of ideas that the word ' nation ' called up in his mind, he would undoubtedly have answered, not a ' Concert of Europe ' or a ' Balance of Power ', but the constitution of a university. The students who attended the international universities of the medieval West were grouped, for purposes of self-government, in ' nations ' whose function was something like that of the ' tribes ' in an Ancient Greek city-state. Each of these academic nations, however, included students speaking several vernacular tongues and owing allegiance at home to many different rulers ; and there was no relation between them and the electoral colleges which appointed the Emperor and the Pope. In other words, there was no relation between medieval ' nations ' and medieval ' Great Powers ', and it was only when the two established Great Powers broke down, towards the close of the Middle Ages, that the nations began to play a political part. By the year 1414 the prestige of the Papacy had been so far reduced, partly by a protracted schism and partly by the scandalous conduct of some of the claimants to the office,¹ that, on the Emperor Sigismund's initiative, a Council was called at Constance in which, to quote Gibbon, ' the number and weight of civil and ecclesiastical members might seem to constitute the states-general of Europe '. When this Council, after deposing all the three rival Popes of the day, proceeded, in 1417, to the election of a new incumbent, the somewhat discredited College of twenty-three Cardinals was reinforced for the occasion by thirty deputies representing the Council, and these deputies were chosen in equal numbers from five ' nations '. Yet these five nations were not equated, as were the five ' Great Powers ' of the Congress of Vienna, with the five most powerful states of the time, to the exclusion of the remainder, but each included several kingdoms, peoples, and languages, so that jointly they represented the whole of Western society.²

¹ ' Of the three Popes John the twenty-third was the first victim : he fled, and was brought back a prisoner ; the most scandalous charges were suppressed ; the Vicar of Christ was only accused of piracy, murder, rape, sodomy and incest ; and, after subscribing his own condemnation, he expiated in prison the imprudence of trusting his person to a free city beyond the Alps.' (Gibbon : *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Ch. LXX.)

² Mr. J. L. Hammond has drawn the writer's attention to an interesting foot-note to the passage from *The Decline and Fall*, quoted above, describing the controversy which arose on this occasion between the English and French delegations to the Council of Constance as to whether there were four nations in Western Christendom or five. The French contended that the English were one of the peoples comprehended in the French nation, while the English

The Council of Constance, however, marked the transition to a new age, for the effacement of the Empire and the Papacy and the evolution of the territorial species of Great Power was one of those radical changes which transformed Western society towards the close of the fifteenth century.¹ From that time onwards territorial Great Powers became the characteristic feature of the Western political landscape, but it did not follow that they would maintain this predominant position for ever. Non-territorial Powers based, like the medieval Papacy and Empire, upon imponderable moral forces or traditions might reappear;² or else, while the basis remained territorial, a collision, or series of collisions, between the different local Powers might lead to the destruction of all but one, leaving society under the dominion of a single Power exercising a universal empire. In the history of other societies, the system of local Powers, when once it had appeared, had ended in this way, sooner or later, in most cases of which a record had survived.³ The same danger had threatened the existence of the system three times already since its first appearance in the West, and each time this danger had been averted at the cost of a general war. The last general war, which had begun in 1792 and had terminated in the Vienna Congress of 1814-5, had been a conflict between Revolu-

maintained that the British Isles constituted a fifth nation, on the ground that they contained eight kingdoms and four or five languages (i. e. that they were an entity which a British publicist writing in the year 1925 would have described not as a nation but as a commonwealth of nations). Eventually the English view prevailed; and if it is true, as Gibbon suggests, that the ruling of the Council was partly determined by the military victories of Henry V, that is a clear sign that Western society in 1417 was in transition from the medieval to the post-medieval phase.

¹ During the two preceding centuries, between 1275 and 1475, a system of territorial Powers had been worked out experimentally, on a miniature scale, in Northern and Central Italy, which had isolated itself temporarily from the remainder of Western Europe and had entered precociously upon a new phase of life into which the Trans-Alpine parts of Western Europe were not initiated until two centuries later.

² By January, 1920, a potential Great Power of this type had already emerged in the shape of the League of Nations. The fathers of the 'Third International' would doubtless have claimed a place for their child in the same company!

³ A struggle between Great Powers resulting in the elimination of all but one of them was the genesis of the Roman Empire in the Graeco-Roman World, the Achaemenid Empire in the Middle Eastern World, the Empire of the Maurya Dynasty (Chandragupta and Açoka) in the Ancient Indian World, and the Empire of the Ts'in and Han Dynasties in the Ancient Far Eastern World. A universal empire arising in this way appears to be a common penultimate phase in the life-history of civilizations. The last phase is the spread of a universal religion, for which the universal empire prepares the ground, and in which the existing civilization is dissolved and transmuted into a new form of society.

tionary France and all the other European Powers. The last but one which had begun with the French invasion of Holland in the year 1672,¹ and had terminated in the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, had been occasioned by the ambition of France under Louis XIV. The first of the series had begun with the outbreak of war between the colossal Spanish Monarchy and France in 1552, had continued in the struggles of the Netherlands and England against the efforts of Spain to maintain or impose her ascendancy, and had terminated with the tacit acknowledgement of Dutch independence by the Spanish Government in the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609. The fourth general war of 1914 was akin to its predecessors in being fought, first and foremost, to determine whether one Great Power should establish its supremacy over the whole of society.

This possibility, which was arousing anxieties or ambitions in the minds of statesmen on the eve of the War of 1914, at that time seemed the only conceivable way in which the existing system of territorial Great Powers might come to an end. It was not, however, taken very seriously by opinion at large; for, even if another general war were to break out (a contingency which most people were unable to picture in their imagination, even if they admitted it with their reason), it was hardly expected to end in any catastrophic overthrow of the *status quo*. With their vast territories, resources, and populations and their highly organized internal economy, the Great Powers of the day appeared to be beyond the reach of destruction except by some upheaval so terrific that it would uproot, with them, the very foundations of human life. Short of this, the existing Great Powers were assumed to be permanent features in the landscape. No doubt their contours might be modified gradually by the forces of Nature, but they were commonly regarded as secure against all possibility of violent overthrow or disruption. This belief was a natural inference from the movement of history during the previous four centuries and a half. Since their first appearance, the local Great Powers of the West had been gaining ground inexorably at the expense of their smaller neighbours, and during the half-century preceding the War of 1914 this process of political consolidation had come very near to completion.

In Europe the number of sovereign independent states on the political map was at its lowest between the years 1871 and 1878.

¹ The previous French attempt upon the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) in 1667-8 was an overture which bore somewhat the same relation to the main struggle as the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars bore to the War of 1914. The invasion of Holland in 1672 was the crucial act.

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At that moment the unification of Germany and Italy had already taken place, while Greece was the only state which had yet extricated itself completely from the Ottoman Empire; and between 1878 and 1914 the European situation remained substantially unchanged. It is true that during these latter years the process of territorial disintegration which had been initiated by the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece made a notable advance in the Balkan Peninsula. By 1914, those European territories which, a century before, had been under the direct or indirect sovereignty of a single government in Constantinople, had nearly all been divided among no less than six small independent states¹ administered from new seats of government. This, however, was generally dismissed at the time as a peculiar local phenomenon, due to the exceptional weakness and maladministration of the Ottoman Empire and likely to be confined, even there, to territories in which non-Muslims and non-Turks were in a majority. Nor had the Ottoman Empire itself been numbered among the Great Powers since the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74. The formation of the Balkan States was thus regarded at the time (except perhaps, in the Foreign Offices of Vienna and St. Petersburg) as simply a local transfer of territory from one lesser state to several others rather more insignificant than itself; and whatever this disruptive movement in an outlying corner of Europe might portend to a few prophetic minds, at this stage it failed altogether to affect the general appearance of the map, for meanwhile the opposite and older process of consolidation had been making unprecedented strides in the world as a whole.

Between 1878 and 1914 the entire continent of Africa, with the two exceptions of Abyssinia and Liberia,² was partitioned (under the various formulae of annexation, protectorate, sphere of influence or provisional occupation) by seven states whose seats of government lay in Europe, and the lion's share was appropriated by four Great Powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.³ During the

¹ Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro. Of these, Montenegro alone had never been under Ottoman sovereignty, but at least half its territories, within the frontiers of 1914, had been taken, at various times, from the Ottoman Empire.

² Liberia might almost be considered a protectorate of the United States, in which case Abyssinia would be the sole fully independent and sovereign state surviving in all Africa.

³ In this partition of Africa, Spain hardly increased her previous holdings except in the Rif (a formidable gift which the Great Powers thrust upon her in order to avoid friction among themselves); Portugal somewhat extended the hinterland of her possessions on the west and east coasts (the oldest European colonies in Africa); and Belgium alone among the lesser European

same period important, though less striking, acquisitions were made by the Great Powers in Asia. The British and Russian spheres of influence in the Middle East were extended over Afghanistan and Persia ; the British Empire absorbed Upper Burma and the Shan States ; France increased her holdings in Indo-China at the expense of Siam ; the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain ; Japan acquired Formosa and Korea and brought Southern Manchuria under her control, leaving the control of Northern Manchuria in the hands of Russia ; and at Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, and Kiaochao, Japan, Great Britain, and Germany respectively established naval bases commanding the maritime approaches to the capital of the Chinese Empire.¹ These first lodgements of the Great Powers in the vast body of China, which began in the closing years of the nineteenth century, were significant ; for China, which was certainly the most populous and potentially perhaps the wealthiest country in the world, had previously remained outside the Western Great Power system. She had neither chosen to transform herself, like her Far Eastern sister, Japan, into a Power on the Western model, nor had she succumbed to Western political dominion like India. During the twenty years preceding the outbreak of the War of 1914, however, China seemed to be drifting, after all, towards the destiny to which India had succumbed a century earlier. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 destroyed an empire far more ancient and more solidly established than that of the Mughals ; and on this analogy it might have been prophesied, on the eve of the War, that after furnishing a battle-ground for the rival Powers that were pressing in upon her, China would eventually fall under the undisputed dominion of some one among their number.

It might be contended, perhaps, that while this process of consolidation to the profit of the Great Powers was going forward in Africa and Asia, a new world of lesser states had been called into existence in Latin America to redress the balance of the old, and that, whereas the disintegration of Turkey-in-Europe might be a parochial matter, the political destinies of an entire continent were involved in that break up of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires beyond the Atlantic which was already almost complete before the beginning of the Greek War of Independence. By the time that

States secured (as the heir of King Leopold in the Congo) a domain at all comparable to the acquisitions of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

¹ On the principle of ' compensation ', France at the same time secured a lease of the less important harbour of Kwangchowwan on the south-west coast of China in the neighbourhood of French Indo-China.

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Turkey-in-Europe had given place to the six petty Balkan States of 1914, no fewer than nineteen independent states had inherited the immense American territories which at one time had been consolidated under the sovereignty of two European Powers. Was not this a counter-process, on too great a scale to be ignored, to the expansion of the Great Powers elsewhere? This view was taken in the United States, where it became the basis of a permanent policy.¹ North American statesmen regarded the system of Great Powers as a specifically European institution, which could and should be eliminated, or at any rate restricted in range at every opportunity, on the American Continent. The overthrow of Spanish and Portuguese rule in America by the spontaneous action of the colonial populations seemed so important a step in this direction that the United States could not afford to see it reversed by a restoration of the previous sovereignties or by the intrusion, in their place, of the leading European Powers of the time; and the occasion led to the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine.

We owe it [wrote President Monroe in his famous message to Congress on the 2nd December, 1823] to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.

The doctrine laid down is perfectly clear, and there was never any doubt of the sincerity of the United States in upholding it. Her intention was strictly negative. She believed that she was excluding Latin America from the field of the Great Power system. In reality, however, she was doing precisely the opposite; for while Spain and Portugal, like Turkey, had ceased to be Great Powers long before they lost their empires (so that this political change in Latin America, like the disintegration of Turkey-in-Europe, involved

¹ See A. Alvarez: *The Monroe Doctrine: Its importance in the International Life of the States of the New World* (published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Oxford University Press, New York, 1924)

nothing more than the transfer of territory from two lesser states to a greater number of the same class), the successful assertion of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States raised that country, in the course of less than a century, to the status of a Great Power herself, with Latin America as her exclusive sphere of influence, and thus resulted in extending the Great Power system from the Old World to the New, although this was precisely what President Monroe sought to prevent in 1823 when the Holy Alliance threatened to intervene in Latin American affairs. This consequence was never, indeed, admitted either by the United States or by the Latin American Republics. The latter, especially, would never agree that their sovereign independence was limited by the Monroe Doctrine—a policy to which they were not parties, though it had a decisive effect upon their destinies. Yet the potency of the United States as a Great Power within the region to which the doctrine applied was demonstrated by the results. Thanks to the presence of the unobtrusive but most effective influence exerted by the State Department at Washington, the Latin-American Republics survived long vicissitudes of anarchy and weakness without falling into that formal and palpable subjection to some European Power or Powers which was the fate of almost every helpless or inefficient state in other continents during the same period. The lesser American like the lesser Asiatic and African countries entered into economic and financial relations with nationals of the European Powers, but they did so with almost complete impunity, whereas in Asia and Africa this was the regular overture to political and military intervention by the Governments of the foreign nationals concerned. In the American Republics, the provocations or excuses for such intervention occurred at least as frequently as elsewhere, and the established policy of the United States alone, but most effectively, prevented other Powers from taking the next traditional step on several well-known occasions. Thus the United States limited the independence of her lesser American neighbours in one way which was wholly beneficial but none the less real: she denied them the liberty to throw away the independence which they had won. In a system of territorial Great Powers no permanent vacuum is possible; and if, during the century ending in the year 1914, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and their Latin-American sisters had not been swallowed up by the expansion of France, Germany, or Great Britain, that was because the United States had continuously covered them with her shadow.

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Thus, by 1914, eight Great Powers—France, Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary ; Russia and Great Britain ; Japan and the United States—had brought the greater part of the earth's surface, resources, and population within their respective spheres of administration, control, or influence. The degree of their collective preponderance can be expressed most clearly in figures. In 1914, China was the only, thickly populated and highly civilized region which was still partially outside the system. Apart from China, and leaving out of account the Latin-American Republics as falling within the orbit of the United States, there were only three countries below the rank of Great Power with populations of over ten millions, and of these three—which were Spain, Turkey, and Abyssinia—it is probable that not one possessed a population of twenty millions at that date.¹ Abyssinia, moreover, was a semi-barbarous community ; Turkey, though subject to no single Power, was under servitudes to them all which hardly left her fully sovereign ; and Spain was really the only unquestionably sovereign and civilized state of this calibre. As for the fourteen states with less than ten millions of population apiece² which were playing an active part in international affairs at this time, in 1914 their combined populations amounted, at an estimate, to something less than sixty millions, that is, several millions less than the probable population, in the same year, of the German Empire in Europe, excluding the German possessions overseas. Yet Germany, in point of population, was only the fourth greatest Power out of the eight ! If the estimated populations of the Belgian Congo and the Dutch East Indies were added to this total, as well as the European and colonial populations of Spain, the grand total might amount to 140,000,000, which was perhaps ten millions less than the contemporary population of the Russian Empire. Had the Latin Americans insisted on being included in the count, they would have found their combined population inferior to that of the United States.³ China, with her alleged but unverified 400,000,000, was the only political aggregate of territory, population,

¹ Spain had 19,951,000. For Turkey there are no exact figures, but 20,000,000 would appear excessive in the light of the censuses since taken in her former Arab territories. Abyssinia can hardly have had more than 11,000,000, and may even have had less than 10,000,000.

² Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in Western Europe ; and Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro in the ex-Ottoman territories of the Balkan Peninsula. See table on p. 32 below.

³ In 1914 the combined population of the Latin-American states (including Haiti) was about 80,000,000 and that of the United States (excluding her overseas possessions) about 97,500,000.

and resources commensurate with those which the Great Powers severally controlled, and the integrity and independence of China were rapidly being undermined.

Thus, in 1914, the Great Powers dominated the stage. Yet even at this time their predominance would have been pronounced to be imposing rather than secure by most of those observers who looked below the surface and back into the past; for these leviathans were the creatures of two primary forces greater than themselves, which had brought them into existence blindly and unconsciously in one phase of their operation and had now entered upon another phase, in which they were beginning remorselessly to undo their own work. These two forces were the Industrial System and the Principle of Nationality.

Between 1815 and 1871, the increase in the scale of economic life had destroyed the self-sufficiency of the smaller European states but had not yet outgrown the capacity of the Great Powers, and in this phase Industrialism had therefore promoted the creation and maintenance of large political units. The economic necessity which had produced the German *Zollverein* had thereby laid the foundations of the German Empire, while conversely the preservation of the Hapsburg Monarchy at that time had been largely due to the fact that its political existence maintained an economic union between the basin of the Middle Danube and a seaboard on the Adriatic. Indeed, every state was striving to secure a window on the sea, either by expanding independently or by amalgamating with some greater neighbour; in 1914 Switzerland and Serbia remained the only altogether land-locked states in Europe;¹ and latterly the Continental Great Powers, not content with reaching the sea, had spread beyond it into territories of different climate, in order to supply their industries with raw materials which they could not produce at home and to find markets for the surplus of their industrial output over their home consumption. Economic self-

¹ A closer examination of the map of 1914 would show, however, that access to the sea was virtually blocked by political frontiers in a number of other cases. Congress Poland, which then formed part of the Russian Empire politically, was shut off economically by Germany from her natural outlet and inlet at the mouth of the Vistula, for which the nominal availability of Russian ports at Riga and Odessa was no compensation. The Austrian port of Trieste, again, was only a nominal economic outlet for the Austrian province of Galicia. Large parts of Germany were politically divided from their natural ports at Rotterdam and Antwerp. Antwerp itself was separated from the open sea by Dutch territorial waters, yet the trade of Antwerp could not be diverted to Ostend or Zeebrugge on the Belgian coastline.

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sufficiency was the conscious aim of every Great Power except the British Empire ; yet, during the period following 1871, when the Continental Powers of Europe were successfully extending their sovereignty overseas and transforming themselves into composite and multi-coloured empires, the swifter march of Industrialism towards world-unity was actually rendering these Great Powers less self-sufficient than they had been when their territories had been confined to a single continent, before the Industrial Revolution had begun.

The impossibility of economic self-sufficiency for any empire not coextensive with the world itself was even more clearly demonstrated at this time in the distribution of population and capital than it was in the exchange of commodities. Of the eight Great Powers of 1914, only three possessed empty lands suitable for permanent settlement by natives of the Temperate Zone in which the home territories of all the Great Powers were situated, and in Russia and the United States alone were these land reserves territorially continuous with the principal existing centres of population. The vacant 'White-Man's-countries' of the British Empire lay beyond the Atlantic or in the Antipodes, and their communications with the mother-country depended upon the supremacy of British sea-power. The ubiquitous interests, in the shape of capital investments or settlements of nationals under foreign flags, which served the Great Powers as arguments for their world-wide intervention, also proved how far their economic life had spread beyond their own political borders, and this was equally true of many lesser states with narrowly limited political interests. The phosphates of Chile were exported as far afield as the cereals of the United States or Russia, while Switzerland and Belgium drew the raw materials for their industries from the same distant sources as Germany or England.

In these circumstances, the world-wide ramifications of transport and intercourse were already beginning to restore to the minor states that place in the regulation of international affairs of which they had almost been deprived by the political expansion of the Great Powers. The routes of railways, telegraphs, and steamships were determined by the new economic considerations of the industrial era ; and, following the line of the greatest economic advantage, they ignored political frontiers and baffled the pursuit of economic self-sufficiency. There were few cases, for example, under the new economic conditions, in which the commercial hinterland of a great continental port coincided in area with the state to which

the port belonged. The hinterland of Genoa included Swiss and German as well as Italian territory; the hinterland of Antwerp French and German as well as Belgian territory; while the industrial districts round the fringes of Bohemia traded down the Elbe through Hamburg rather than across the Danube through Trieste, though Trieste and Bohemia were both at that time included politically in Austria. Certain lesser states found themselves astride the most important modern lines of communication. British mails bound for India via Brindisi passed through one Swiss tunnel, coal travelling from the Ruhr to Milan through another. Every railway-passenger from Europe to Constantinople, or to Asia Minor beyond, was compelled to traverse Bulgaria. Turkey, at the Black Sea Straits, controlled all the trade in cereals and other bulky commodities which passed out of and into Southern Russia; and a few Persians, by a few blows of a hatchet, could sever the overland telegraph between India and the West. Thus, the peoples of certain small states were placed in a position to arrest the economic activities of the Great Powers and their nationals by detaining trains and ships or by refusing postal facilities, and they might even decimate their populations by neglecting quarantines, since microbes violate frontiers with greater ease than goods or human beings.

During the half-century preceding the War of 1914, this new economic tendency brought into existence a number of international organizations of a new type, concerned not with those political questions which were the traditional subjects of international relations but with posts,¹ railways, shipping, hygiene, and other economic affairs which could not be dealt with effectively by any state in isolation; and the procedure which was developed in these organizations differed in two notable respects from that of political conferences between the Powers. In the first place, the Great Powers and the lesser states here met upon a footing of equality, since in these economic matters the lesser states had something to grant or to withhold and the Powers something to gain by agreement with them.² In the second place, though the co-operation of states

¹ The Telegraphic Union was formed in 1864, the Postal Union in 1875. The genesis and nature of these international organizations is explained in an illuminating work by Mr. L. S. Woolf on *International Government* (2nd edition, London, 1924, Allen & Unwin). See his classification (pp. 159-61) of the organizations of this kind which existed at the outbreak of the War of 1914.

² Each state represented in these organizations had one vote irrespective of its size, population, and wealth, but Mr. Woolf points out that the Great Powers in practice secured representation corresponding to their actual

in these economic organizations was voluntary, it was found possible to carry out the will of the majority without always waiting for that unanimity which was indispensable for any political action of an international character. Uniformity being the essence of success in problems of transport and communication, it was essential that the establishment of uniformity as far as attainable by consent should not be suspended by the recalcitrance of one or two parties. At the same time, the parties that found themselves in a minority on different occasions learnt by experience that, at any rate in the economic sphere, the general advantages of solidarity were worth the price of a concession to the majority on any particular point at issue.¹

Thus, by 1914, the Great Powers were already becoming accustomed to surrender in the new economic field some of that exclusive authority which they had previously conquered in the political arena. Great as they were, they were not great enough for the new world-wide economic operations of the changing society to which they belonged, and their pretensions to economic self-sufficiency were destined to be shattered finally by the War. The economic blockade of Russia by the Central Powers and of the Central Powers by the Western Powers was more potent than military force or diplomatic pressure ; the British Empire suffered greater peril from the submarine campaign against her merchant shipping than from any military or naval encounters with her enemies ; and the Allied and Associated Powers eventually won the War because they pooled their own economic resources and were also able in addition to draw upon those of the neutrals overseas. In fact, the Great Powers, as a class, were being dwarfed by the increasing scale of operations in the economic sphere, and at the same time they were being dislocated in the political sphere by the increasing differentiation of national consciousness—a recent development which was reversing the effect of Nationalism upon the structure of states and was producing tendencies towards devolution or disruption.

In Western Europe, where the idea of Nationality had first arisen, this new tendency was hardly apparent. The West European nations had slowly grown to consciousness within the framework of pre-established states ;² and in this region, so far from there

importance by obtaining separate votes for their dominions and dependencies and by dominating the sub-committees in which business was prepared for the congresses. (*Op. cit.*, pp. 199–200.)

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

² Except in Ireland, where the phenomena were similar to those in Eastern Europe which are discussed below.

being any conflict between the sense of nationality and the traditional frontiers, those frontiers had themselves been the principal factors in determining national associations. Indeed, by creating united nations out of different linguistic groups and by dividing single linguistic groups among more than one nation, the traditional frontiers in Western Europe had in many cases actually overridden the barriers and affinities of language;¹ and West European Nationalism, as a function of these traditional frontiers, was on the whole a conservative force. On the other hand, Nationalism had developed creative powers in the countries colonized by the West European nations overseas. One of the eight Great Powers existing in 1914 had been brought into existence, a century and a half before, by the growth of a separate national consciousness among the descendants of British nationals who had settled on the North American continent; the Latin nations of America had originated in a similar secession from their European kinsmen a generation later; and, during the half-century ending in 1914, a separate national consciousness had been growing up very rapidly in the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth.² In all these instances a Nationalism stimulated not, as in Western Europe, by long undisturbed associations of neighbourhood within traditional frontiers but by the common adaptation of colonists to a new environment in a distant country overseas had tended to multiply the number of self-conscious and self-governing nations, and so to counteract that tendency towards the consolidation of a small number of centralized political units which had been the first and the most obvious effect of the expansion of the Great

¹ e. g. the Belgian and Swiss nations had been formed out of populations speaking two and three languages respectively, no single one of which preponderated in the new community; while the French nation contained speakers of German in Alsace and Lorraine, of Flemish in the Nord, of Breton in the West, and of Basque in the South, who were all just as French in national feeling as their fellow countrymen who spoke the French language as their mother tongue. On the other hand, a French-speaking Belgian or Swiss did not share in the French national consciousness.

² In this last case, the growth of a separate national consciousness had not been accompanied by that estrangement and eventual secession of the new nations overseas from the mother country in Western Europe which had occurred in the previous instances. The British Commonwealth, with the wisdom of experience, had learnt to adapt its political structure to the inevitable differentiation of consciousness among overseas communities of West European origin. Yet the fact that British statesmanship succeeded in the nineteenth century where it had failed in the eighteenth does not mean that the development of Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and South African national consciousness was different in kind from the development of American national consciousness in the Thirteen Colonies a century earlier.

Powers. It is true that this devolutionary movement overseas had sometimes been obscured by other circumstances. For example, Great Britain had acquired a second empire so rapidly after the loss of her first that the disruption of a great political unit, which had occurred at the birth of the American nation, was frequently forgotten. Again, when the Latin-American nations broke their political connexion with Spain and Portugal, they were brought by the Monroe Doctrine within the political orbit of the United States and played no active part in international affairs during the next century, so that their existence as separate nations made little impression beyond the limits of the American Continent. Finally, the development of national self-consciousness and national self-government in the British Dominions, which had been in progress for half a century before the War of 1914, had established a peculiar relation of diversity in unity and unity in diversity, which was deliberately left undefined by a tacit mutual understanding between the peoples and governments concerned. None the less, the devolutionary tendency of Nationalism overseas was unmistakable. Whereas in the old countries of Western Europe the sense of Nationality was preserving traditional frontiers, in the new countries overseas it was bringing new nations to birth. At the same time, the creative Nationalism of the overseas world and the conservative Nationalism of Western Europe retained one important common feature. They both still rested principally upon geographical association rather than upon community of language,¹ and in this respect they differed in equal measure from the species of Nationalism that was spreading from Western Europe overland into other parts of the Continent.

In Central and Eastern Europe the growing consciousness of Nationality had attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations but almost exclusively to mother tongues, and its general tendency was to produce revolutionary changes in the pre-existing political map by forcing it into conformity with the linguistic map wherever possible. The practical effects of this tendency naturally varied in accordance with the relation which the two maps had borne to one another previously. In Italy and Germany, where two large areas in either of which

¹ The new geographical associations created in Canada and South Africa had begun to form united nations out of populations speaking different West European languages, in much the same way as certain pre-established political frontiers had created single nations out of the diverse linguistic elements of Belgium and Switzerland.

a single language was spoken happened to have been divided between a considerable number of states, the progress of linguistic Nationalism between 1815 and 1871 co-operated with the economic tendency of the time to merge as many as thirty-one lesser or intermediate states into two large states of the Great Power standard.¹ On the other hand, this same linguistic Nationalism operated upon the political map of Eastern Europe as a violently disruptive force; for in this region the pre-existing states were larger and not smaller than the linguistic areas.

In Eastern Europe the development of the political map before the War of 1792-1815 had been similar to the development in Western Europe and in sharp contrast to that in Italy and Germany. From the fourteenth century onwards, there had been a tendency towards the formation and expansion of Great Powers at the expense of lesser states. The East European movement began with a number of shifting experimental combinations in the form of personal unions under a single sovereign or dynasty. The first attempt at union was between Hungary and Poland (in 1370-82 and again in 1440-4); but this proved to be a false step (comparable to the attempts at union between England and France which were made during the

¹ In this revolutionary change of the political map, which is commonly regarded as a triumph of linguistic Nationalism, the part played by economic forces must not be underestimated. With the exception of the Hanse towns, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and the *Reichsland* taken from France, the territories united politically into the German *Reich* in 1871 had already been united economically under the *Zollverein*, and it is significant that the *Reich* followed the *Zollverein* in accepting as its eastern frontier the existing western frontiers of the Russian and Austrian Empires. It was natural that the *Zollverein* should stop at this line, beyond which lay two large compact areas which had already attained to internal economic unification; but it was a quite illogical frontier for an empire based on the principle of linguistic nationality, since it incorporated several million Poles in Germany and left many more million Germans in Austria and Russia. In this instance, therefore, linguistic Nationalism was only able to overthrow traditional frontiers in so far as it was reinforced by considerations of economic convenience, and in other quarters also the new German national state did not attempt to carry out its own principles to logical consequences by making its frontiers coincide at all points with the boundaries of the German language. There was no movement for the incorporation in Germany of German Switzerland; and the attempt to adopt the linguistic border as the new political frontier between Germany and France was a disastrous failure. In Alsace-Lorraine, traditional associations counted for more than language, and the native inhabitants of the *Reichsland* remained persistently French in feeling from 1871 until their reincorporation in France in 1918. There were similar phenomena in the formation of the Italian national state. No attempt was made to incorporate in the new Italy the Italian-speaking Swiss canton of Ticino, and the frontier towards Austria was fixed in 1866, and stood until the War of 1914, at the line which had divided the territories of Austria and Venice before 1797, though this frontier was markedly out of relation to the boundary between the Italian, German, and Slovene languages.

Hundred Years' War), for though the two countries resembled one another in social organization and in culture, there was not sufficient geographical cohesion between them. On the other hand, geographical contiguity, reinforced by the common menace from the German *Drang nach Osten*, gave permanence to the personal union of 1386 between Poland and Lithuania, and this was consummated by the organic constitutional union of 1569. Meanwhile, from 1436 onwards, Hungary repeatedly gravitated towards Bohemia and Austria, who were her natural partners from the geographical point of view, though it needed the menace of the Ottoman invasion to produce the more stable union of 1526 under the Hapsburg Dynasty, which lasted till 1918. This Danubian Monarchy of the Hapsburgs, the rival Empire of the Osmanlis which marched with it on the south-east, and the United Republic of Poland and Lithuania between the Carpathians and the Baltic were the three oldest East European Great Powers, and each of these was built up mainly by the unification of a number of smaller East European states under some local dynasty. On the other hand, Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Prussia-Germany, which successively played the part of a fourth Power in East European affairs, had their centres of gravity outside Eastern Europe and only touched the fringes of the area. Sweden's place was taken by Prussia soon after the beginning of the eighteenth century, and about the same time the number of Powers in Eastern Europe was temporarily increased from four to five by the entrance of Russia into the European system; but within less than a century the number was reduced again by the elimination of Poland, which once more brought the whole region under the exclusive dominion of four Powers: Turkey, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. In fact, by 1795 the simplification had gone to the length of eliminating all buffer states and leaving the Great Powers in direct contact at every point with one another. The Baltic Provinces, for example, did not retain their separate political existence as buffers between Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, as the Low Countries did between Germany, France, and Great Britain; nor was Bohemia enabled by her mountain ramparts to play the part of an East European Switzerland. In Eastern Europe, the number of sovereign independent states on the political map was at its lowest between the final partition of Poland in 1795 and the establishment in 1830 of the Kingdom of Greece—the first independent national state to be created at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. During the intervening years, three Great Powers

(Prussia,¹ Austria, and Russia) and one *ci-devant* Great Power (the Ottoman Empire) shared Eastern Europe between them to the exclusion of every other sovereignty ; and, as far as the three Great Powers on the active list were concerned, this monopoly remained outwardly unimpaired until the War of 1914. On the eve of the War, they still appeared impregnable, and only a few fanatical devotees of Nationalism ventured to imagine that the forces of disruption which had prevailed, in the meantime, against decrepit Turkey could also prevail against them. Internally, however, these three empires were already sapped by the disease to which Turkey had visibly succumbed.

In 1914, the map of Eastern Europe differed from that of Central and Western Europe in two important respects. The East European Great Powers had neither become the parents of nations, like the Powers of the West, nor were they themselves the children of national movements like the Kingdom of Italy or the German *Reich*. They had consolidated territories on the political map, but they had not inspired any solidarity of feeling among the heterogeneous populations which they had penned up together inside their respective frontiers, and so the political unification of these great territories under the Governments of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin had not been followed by the creation of great nations with a common consciousness transcending differences of language, like those nations which had been learning to govern themselves from West European centres of political authority such as London, Paris, Brussels, or Berne. This failure, which had a profound effect upon the history of Eastern Europe both during and after the War of 1914, was partly due to particular political accidents but no doubt in larger measure to the general backwardness of political and social development in this area as compared with the countries farther west. Among the untoward accidents, it is sufficient to mention the partition of the United Republic of Poland and Lithuania, which arrested the development of a common national feeling among the Polish, Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian-speaking populations of the extinguished state and drove them to seek fresh national

¹ From the standpoint of the Nationality Movement, Prussia (and after 1871 the German *Reich*) was all the time playing two different parts until she lost her Polish provinces under the Treaty of Versailles. In her westward expansion (including the formation of the German *Zollverein*) she laid the foundations of the German National State, while her eastward expansion made her at the same time a multi-national empire of the same class as Russia, Austria, and Turkey.

inspiration in their respective linguistic affinities. Yet, even if there had been no partition, the subsequent course of events in the neighbouring Hapsburg Monarchy makes it doubtful whether the Polish Republic would have ever achieved the same degree of national unity, throughout the territories which it held together in 1772, as had been achieved already in eighteenth-century Britain and France. The Hapsburg Monarchy escaped partition until 1918; yet at the time when Poland was being partitioned (between 1772 and 1795) the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II was vainly attempting to produce in his dominions, on a German basis, the same organic unity that declared itself spontaneously among the people of Revolutionary France, including the German and Flemish-speaking Frenchmen in Alsace and the Nord. Even after Joseph's failure there was no theoretical reason why the Hapsburg Monarchy should not develop a sense of national unity based, like that of Switzerland, on the principle of linguistic equality; but the spirit of toleration which solved the problem in Switzerland was never approached in the Danubian Monarchy, and the *Ausgleich* of 1867 was constructed on the basis of an ascendancy to be exercised jointly by the two strongest linguistic groups in the Monarchy over the rest. In consequence, the idea of Nationality, as it spread among the populations of Eastern Europe, attached itself not to the pre-existing political groups but to the language groups which underlay them; and this divorce between national consciousness and the political *status quo*, which had helped to consolidate the political map in Italy and Germany, threatened, in the vast area monopolized by the three East European Powers,¹ to break great empires into pieces. In Central Europe, between 1815 and 1871, the linguistic groups which were seeking to express themselves on the political map had been larger than the pre-existing states which stood in their way. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the linguistic groups were not disposed on the map in broad masses with clear-cut lines of division, but were interlocked in an elaborate mosaic, as a result of historical causes which had been in operation since the early Middle Ages. The boundaries between East European languages coincided at very few points with the physical boundaries of mountain, river, or coastline, and usually there was no boundary at all, but an intermediate zone where the populations were completely intermingled and where language was a function of class, occupation,

¹ Reckoning Prussia-Germany as an East European Power in respect of her Polish territories.

or religion and not of locality. In such areas it had evidently been the 'historical mission' of the East European Great Powers to create a sense of solidarity overriding the linguistic map and so to build up multilingual nationalities, of the Swiss and Belgian¹ type, though on a much larger geographical scale; but the failure of Austria, Russia, and Prussia to win the hearts of their East European subjects left the field open for other political faiths. In Eastern Europe the principle of linguistic Nationalism encountered no settled loyalties like that which ultimately defeated Germany's attempt to detach the allegiance of the Alsatians from France. Spiritually, the new gospel of linguistic Nationality took Eastern Europe by storm, and the Powers whose title it challenged and whose very right of existence it denied found no weapon with which to oppose it except physical force. This formidable but purely material obstacle was first overcome by the Serbs, Greeks, and other Balkan nationalities because the Ottoman Empire, with which they had to deal, was physically weaker in the nineteenth century than the other East European Empires; but Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin were as incapable as Constantinople of opposing to Nationalism the moral force of a counter-ideal, and, almost a century before the War of 1914, the Austrian statesman Metternich had divined that the establishment of Greek independence would undermine the moral foundations of every Great Power in Eastern Europe. In fact, no permanent compromise was possible between the progress of linguistic Nationalism and the East European *status quo*. Either Nationalism would be brought to a permanent halt at the western borders of Austria, Russia, and Prussian Poland, or else it would bring the three East European Powers to destruction as surely as it had already destroyed the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Peninsula and the *Kleinstaaten* in Italy and Germany. In this titanic conflict for the possession of Eastern Europe—a conflict waged between overwhelming material force and an invincible political idea—the issue was decided by the economic factor in the War of 1914. The internal assaults of Nationalism upon the structure of the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov Empires were

¹ Belgium was not so perfect an example of the type as Switzerland, for while constitutionally she was a centralized state and not a federation, the unity of her national consciousness was impaired, between 1839 and 1914, by a tendency towards linguistic nationalism on the part of the Flemings. Long before the War of 1914 a Flemish revival had been started in reaction to the encroachments of the French language, which was the vernacular of Brussels and the official language of the national administration and of the universities. (See *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 72-4.)

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then reinforced by the remorseless pressure of the blockade, and four years of this terrible warfare on two fronts were sufficient to lay in ruins three Powers out of the eight, with a revolutionary effect upon the map of the world.

(iii) The Political Map in 1920-3

Anyone who compares the political map of 1920 with that of 1914 will be struck by one visible change : in 1920 the Great Powers no longer dominated the landscape as they had done before. This change was not due to the intervention of new forces nor even to some sudden shift in the play of the forces previously at work. In 1920 the evolution of the map was still being determined by the Industrial Revolution and the Nationality Movement, the two forces which had been paramount in the world for about half a century and active for fully a century before that ; and although the influence of these forces on the fortunes of the Great Powers had undoubtedly altered since the forces first came into operation, the alteration had been taking place gradually below the surface for some time past. The violent upheaval of the War which had broken the crust of the map had simply brought to light in a striking way what was already going on beneath it.

For the sake of clearness, this process, which has been discussed in the preceding section, may be recapitulated in a few sentences here. Until about the year 1875, the progress of Industrialism and Nationalism had combined to promote the formation of Great Powers ; the German *Zollverein*, the German *Reich*, and the political and economic unification of Italy were products of this phase during which the two forces worked together ; but from about 1875 onwards, as Industrialism and Nationalism developed further, they began to pull in different directions, and in either case the new tendency was as unfavourable to the Great Powers as the previous tendency had been profitable to them. On the one hand the Industrial Revolution, which had first outgrown the limits of the small German and Italian States of 1815, and had thus encouraged their consolidation into the two Great Powers completed in 1870 and 1871, had continued to enlarge the scale of its operations until the Great Powers themselves could no longer contain them. By 1914 the German Empire, including the tropical dependencies which it had acquired overseas, had become less 'self-contained' in the economic sense than Saxony or Bavaria had been a century earlier ; and even the

British Empire, which was the greatest of the eight Great Powers of 1914 in area, population, and diversity of climates and resources, was then dependent economically upon its trade with Germany and other countries, large and small, outside its own imperial frontiers. In fact, the progress of the Industrial Revolution had made even the greatest of the previous units inadequate from the economic point of view, and was merging them all in one single economic system coextensive with the world itself. Thus the economic reason for the existence of the Great Powers had partly disappeared; and, at the same time, some of these very Powers which were being dwarfed by the expansion of Industrialism were being dislocated by the Nationality Movement, which had been spreading from its starting-place in Western Europe to regions where the creation of new national states would mean, not bringing new Great Powers into being, but breaking up the Great Powers already in existence. The weakening of the Great Powers through this alteration in the play of the two primary forces was already far advanced when the War broke out, and it was because the ground had been prepared in advance that the effect of the War upon the Great Powers as a class was destructive.

The partial eclipse in 1920 of the Great Powers of 1914 was accompanied by two closely related phenomena: an increase in the importance of world-wide international organizations and a decline in the importance of continental Europe in international affairs.

During the half-century ending in 1914, the building up of world-wide organizations, though it had been going forward more rapidly and on a greater scale than was realized by people at large,¹ had been almost confined to international activities of an economic character, such as those with which the Postal and Telegraphic Unions were concerned. On the 10th January, 1920, the movement towards world organization was carried into the political sphere by the inauguration of the League of Nations; and this was an important innovation, for, in the sphere of international politics, Europe (with its annexes and dependencies in the Near and Middle East and in Tropical Africa) had continued, during this same half-century ending in 1914, to be almost the exclusive field of organized relations. In 1914 the 'Far Eastern Question' had scarcely risen above the horizon; the Pacific was still without form and void; and the Concert of Powers, by which the international affairs of the world

¹ See L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, especially pp. 159-61 (2nd ed.).

were governed (as far as they were governed at all), was spoken of familiarly and not yet incorrectly as the 'Concert of Europe'. Of the eight Great Powers which existed in 1914, four—namely, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—were almost wholly European;¹ two others—the British Empire and the Russian Empire—lay partly in Europe and partly outside it;² only two—the United States and Japan—lay outside Europe altogether; and although these had come to rank as Great Powers, they held aloof from the Concert except on the rare occasions when their own regional interests were in question. In fact, the unification of the whole world into a single system, which had visibly taken place in the economic sphere some time before 1914, had not yet been completed in the sphere of political relations—though, here again, strong tendencies in that direction could already be observed below the surface.

In 1920, on the other hand, it was quite evident that a Concert of European Powers could no longer provide the framework for any kind of world organization. Of the European or partly European Powers, Austria-Hungary had disappeared, while Germany and Russia had been permanently weakened by the loss of vast territories and temporarily paralysed by military defeat, political revolution, and economic chaos. In contrast to this, the United States, Japan, the overseas partners in the British Commonwealth, and the Latin-American Republics had all relatively increased in strength and had all become involved more closely than before in the main system of political relations. In other words, 'Europe' had been merged in 'the World', and this fact was recognized by the statesmen at the Peace Conference of Paris. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, which included the United States and Japan, and the League of Nations, which was intended eventually to include every 'fully self-governing' state in existence, were deliberate attempts to substitute a world-wide for a European organization. In this respect they were in harmony with the realities of the new international situation (though their effectiveness might be diminished for the time being by the exclusion of Germany, the

¹ Austria-Hungary had no overseas possessions, while those of the other three (France not excepted) were appendages which counted for little by comparison with their possessions on the European continent.

² The 'Europe' of the Concert (1815–1914) did not really include either the Balkan Peninsula or Russia east of the meridian of Petrograd. The international affairs of these regions were detached at that time from those of Europe proper, and formed part of the 'Eastern Question'.

withdrawal of the United States, and the aloofness of Russia). At the same time, this deliberate change of scale—statesmanlike though it was on a long view—had one immediate result which was unfortunate. It left Europe without any regional organization of her own for dealing with specifically European problems—and this at the very time when Europe, as the principal theatre of the late War and of the territorial changes which had followed it, was in special need of systematic reconstruction. Abruptly, Europe seemed to have reversed her role and to have changed from the focus of international affairs into a half-derelict continent; and the acute perplexities that necessarily accompanied this revolution went far to account for the failure to settle the Reparation Problem and the delay in the reorganization of Eastern Europe during the next four years. The problems of Europe will be dealt with separately in the following volume; but, in this introduction, it may be convenient first to consider certain general changes connected with the weakening of the Great Powers as a class and with the growth of international organizations embracing not merely Europe but the world as a whole.

The fate which had overtaken Germany, Austria-Hungary,¹ and Russia was perhaps less significant for the future prospects of the Great Powers than the success of the British Empire and the United States in adapting themselves to the new international environment by voluntary changes. Before the War both the English-speaking Powers had exercised some kind of hegemony over certain peoples of West European origin overseas, among whom the consciousness of nationality was rapidly increasing in intensity—the British Dominions in the one case and the Latin-American Republics in the other. The similarity between the relationships in the two cases must not be over-stressed, for obviously the bond between the members of the British Commonwealth, with their common sovereign and their common mother tongue, was very much closer than that created by the Monroe Doctrine, which, as formulated in 1823, had been a one-sided declaration depending for its sanction on the will of a single Power, and which had not affected the juridical sovereignty of the states to which it applied. In two respects, however, there was a real likeness between the two situations. In the first place, the spread of the nationality move-

¹ See Mr. L. B. Namier's masterly analysis of the dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy (*H. P. C.*, vol. iv, Ch. I, Part 3), which throws a flood of light upon the psychological side of the catastrophe.

ment had introduced new difficulties into the relationship between both Powers and their respective satellites ; and, in the second place, when these difficulties had arisen, both Powers had met them, before it was too late, by substituting the conception of partnership for that of ascendancy, instead of taking up that attitude of uncompromising resistance to the national principle which had been adopted, with such fatal consequences to themselves, by the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov Empires.

By 1914 practically all the overseas populations of West European origin in the British Commonwealth had been granted national self-government ; during the War itself the more difficult task of initiating the process in India was taken in hand ; and devolution was afterwards carried into other fields by the establishment of the Irish Free State under the Treaty of the 6th December, 1921, and by the qualified recognition of Egyptian independence on the 28th February, 1922.¹ At the same time there had been an equivalent development in the policy of the United States towards the Latin-American Republics. In convening the first Pan-American Congress in 1889, the Government of the United States had inaugurated a policy of carrying out the Monroe Doctrine by a free co-operation between all the parties concerned ; and this new orientation was confirmed in President Wilson's message to Congress on the 7th December, 1915, in which he deliberately substituted for the conception of guardianship and wardship the other conception of partnership 'upon a footing of equality and genuine independence'.²

The policy which the British Empire and the United States had thus pursued for a considerable time before the outbreak of the War was justified by the results of the War itself. No doubt their

¹ These latter events may be mentioned here by anticipation, because they marked the point at which the British Empire apparently steered clear of that collision with the forces of Nationalism which had proved fatal to Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. In Ireland, Great Britain was faced with a nationality problem of an East European character, compared to which her difficulties in Canada and South Africa had been child's play, and which threatened to impair her good relations with the United States. In Egypt, again, the declaration of the British protectorate in 1914 had brought the British Empire into another conflict with the idea of Nationality, which by this time was making headway in the Middle East as rapidly as it had done in Eastern Europe during the previous half-century.

² See the portions of his message quoted from the *Congressional Record*, vol. liii, pp. 95-6, by W. S. Robertson : *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States*. For a further discussion of the relations between the United States and the Latin-American Republics, see the *Survey of International Affairs for 1925*.

success in carrying it into practical effect was partly due to the favour of Fortune, or the foresight of their ancestors, which had cast the lot of the English-speaking peoples in regions hitherto remote from the centres of international tension ; but the secret of their strength was the elasticity of their political methods, which enabled them to handle their less intractable problems with a lighter and a surer touch. In 1920 there was still a Monroe Doctrine (its validity had been expressly recognized, under Article 21 of the Covenant, by every Member of the League of Nations) and there was still a British Empire (it had entered the League as an original Member), but both the American Entente and the British Empire had been profoundly, though peacefully, transformed. The War, the Peace Conference, and the foundation of the League had given a new significance to the sovereignty of the Latin-American Republics and had reduced the non-sovereignty of the British Dominions to a fiction. For the first time, these two groups of lesser states had played their part in the politics of the great world independently of the Powers in whose orbits they had previously been content to follow. They had found themselves genuinely free to make the momentous choice between neutrality and intervention ;¹ those of them who had become belligerents had been admitted to the Peace Conference at Paris ;² and they had acquired a status, as Members of the League, which was equivalent to full sovereignty, whether or not they happened to be sovereign in name. What, it might be asked, was the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine after the Latin-American Republics, with one or two exceptions, had entered into association with a number of European, Asiatic, and African States in a League from which the United States held aloof and which committed its Members to the obligations of the Covenant under Articles 10-17 ? And what was the meaning of the British Empire when five British Dominions not only possessed separate representation on the League, but voted, when they chose, on the opposite side to the United Kingdom ? In one sense these questions were sufficiently answered by the facts. The American Entente and the British Empire had undoubtedly escaped the

¹ Nine of the Latin-American Republics maintained their neutrality even after the intervention of the United States, and among these were the Argentine Republic and Chile—that is, two out of the three ‘A.B.C.’ states (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) which held the first rank in the Latin-American group.

² Where, on a celebrated occasion, the representatives of Canada and Belgium made a joint protest on behalf of the minor states against the conduct of the Great Powers (*H. P. C.*, vol. vi, p. 346.)

catastrophe which had overtaken three Great Powers in the War of 1914 ; and the difficulty of defining their new position might even be a good augury for their prospects, since, in growing beyond the limits of logical definition, political institutions, like theological dogmas, often gain in vitality. At the beginning of 1920 it would have been rash to prophesy what the eventual metamorphosis of the British Commonwealth and the American Entente was to be, but it was clear already that they were developing into institutions of a different structure from that European species of Great Power which had dominated the international landscape since the latter part of the fifteenth century.

Thus five out of the eight Great Powers of 1914 had either lost their existence or partly changed their character, but at first sight the other three might appear not only to have preserved their identity as centralized states of the old-fashioned type but actually to have increased their strength and resources. In 1914 France, Italy, and Japan had on the whole been weaker than their fellows. France had been overshadowed by Germany, Italy by Austria-Hungary ; and Japan, after being deprived by France, Germany, and Russia of almost all the fruits of her dramatic victory over China in 1894, had been compelled in 1904-5 to fight a second and more costly war with Russia in order to secure a modest place in the sun. By 1920, on the other hand, France had recovered the national frontiers of 1870, established her military supremacy on the Continent to all appearance for an indefinite period to come, maintained and confirmed her protectorate over Morocco, rounded off her empire in North-West Africa by obtaining a mandate, under the League of Nations, for the greater part of the former German possessions in Togoland and the Cameroons,¹ and risen, at Germany's expense, to be potentially one of the principal coal and iron producing countries in Europe. Italy, again, had profited by the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in order to extend her territory beyond the eastern boundaries of the Italian language up to the Brenner Pass and Monte Nevoso—an advance which gave her the best strategic frontiers to be found in this quarter as well as the sovereignty over Trieste, Fiume, and several hundred thousand Germans and Jugoslavs.² As for Japan, Fortune seemed to have singled her

¹ The French mandate for Togoland permitted the mandatory to raise troops in the mandated area for the defence of territory beyond the boundaries of the mandated area itself (*H. P. C.*, vol. vi, p. 642).

² See *H. P. C.*, vol. iv, Ch. V, which is very fully documented and which carries the narrative down to the ratification of the Treaty of Rapallo on

out for her greatest favours, and her dramatic rise during the years 1914-19 is sketched in the following volume.¹

There was, however, another side to each of these pictures. If these three Powers had remained compact and centralized, that was partly because they were each based upon the strength of a single nation exercising an ascendancy over others, and not, like the British Commonwealth or the American Entente, upon a group of nations co-operating to maintain common interests in a spirit of freedom and equality. Thus, while they gained in concentration of force, they suffered from isolation, and the effect of this isolation upon their fortunes will appear as the narrative proceeds. The isolation of France was the key to the history of Western Europe during the next four years² and that of Japan to the history of the Far East and the Pacific,³ while a similar weakness in the position of Italy placed her at the mercy of other Powers in regard to her chief national problem of emigration.

Indeed, the positions of Japan and Italy resembled one another in several respects. Both countries were beset by an acute problem of over-population, which had to be met either by industrialization or by emigration, and both were confronted by obstacles in seeking either of these solutions. The two nations each possessed an ancient fund of technical skill, but their national territories were almost destitute of those raw materials which were essential to industrial development in the modern world; and the territories which each had recently annexed outside its own national domain offered neither mineral resources nor vacant lands for colonization in any appreciable amount, whereas the aggressive policy involved in these somewhat unprofitable annexations had alienated neighbouring peoples with whom they might otherwise have co-operated profitably in the economic field. Thus both Powers had still to look for a solution of their population problem through emigration, and here the obstacles encountered by Italy from 1920 onwards were only less great than those which had long confronted Japan. Italy was the principal sufferer from the measures taken in 1921 for the restriction of immigration into the United States;⁴ and, although she was still

the 2nd February, 1921. The history of Fiume from that date to the official incorporation of the Free City in Italy on the 16th March, 1924, will be dealt with in the *Survey of International Affairs for 1924*.

¹ See the Introduction to Part VI of the *Survey for 1920-3*.

² *Ibid.*, Introduction to Part II.

³ *Ibid.*, Introduction to Part VI.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1924*.

able to send her emigrants in considerable numbers to the Latin-American countries, to the North-West African dominions of France, and even to France herself (who was confronted by the converse problem of depopulation), this meant that the fertility of the Italian people was not being harvested by Italy, but was recruiting the strength of other Latin nations.

For these various reasons it was already doubtful in 1920, to any observer who looked below the surface, whether France, Italy, and Japan would be able to sustain the role of 'Great Powers' as it had been played by the European Powers in concert before 1914; but the deterioration in the position of the Great Powers as a whole could best be measured by the extent to which the states of lower rank had improved their position as a class—partly through the aggrandisement or new creation of such states in Europe, and partly through that profound change in the position of the British Dominions and the Latin-American countries overseas which has been mentioned already.

The relative prominence of the lesser states in international affairs after the War of 1914, owing to the two above-mentioned causes, as compared with the modest position which they had occupied before, will appear from the following table :

TABLE OF STATES, BELOW THE RANK OF GREAT POWERS, WHICH PLAYED AN ACTIVE PART IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR OF 1914

| Before the War. | After the War. |
|--|-----------------|
| 1. <i>States with more than ten millions of population.</i> ¹ | |
| Spain. | Spain. |
| Turkey. | Poland. |
| | Rumania. |
| | Czechoslovakia. |
| | Jugoslavia. |
| | Brazil. |

¹ India, Egypt, Abyssinia, China, and Mexico have been omitted from the second column because, for various reasons, they could hardly be regarded, during the years 1920–3, as fully qualified members of international society. Although the independence of Egypt was recognized by the British Government on the 28th February, 1922, it remained provisional pending the settlement of the four questions reserved on that occasion. Again, although Abyssinia, China, and Mexico were in law completely sovereign and independent states (this status being recognized by the admission of two of them to Membership in the League of Nations—China as an original Member and Abyssinia at the Fourth Assembly in September, 1923), their sovereignty and independence were impaired in practice by their internal conditions.

Before the War.

After the War.

2. *States with less than ten and more than five millions of population.**(a) West European States.¹*

Belgium.
Netherlands.
Sweden.
Portugal.

Belgium.
Netherlands.
Sweden.
Portugal.

(b) East European States.²

Rumania.

Austria.
Hungary.
Greece.
Bulgaria.

(c) Middle Eastern States.

Afghanistan.
Persia.
Turkey.

(d) Far-Eastern States.

Siam.³

(e) Overseas States in the Temperate Zone.

Argentina.
Australia.
Canada.
South Africa.⁴

(f) Overseas States in the Tropical Zone.

Colombia.
Peru.

3. *States with less than five and more than one million of population.⁵**(a) West European States.*

Denmark.
Norway.
Switzerland.

Denmark.
Norway.
Switzerland.

¹ Omitting the non-European populations in the dependencies which several of these states possessed overseas (e. g. the Dutch possessions in the East Indies, the Portuguese in Africa and the Far East, the Belgian in Africa).

² In 1914, Greece and Bulgaria had both fallen about half a million short of the five-million line. In 1923, Greece within the Lausanne frontiers was well above it, while Bulgaria was only 90,000 below it and would soon pass the line by the normal excess of births over deaths.

³ Admitted to the League of Nations as an original member. Before the War of 1914, Siam had been under the joint ascendancy of France and Great Britain.

⁴ Including the coloured population. The White population of British and Dutch origin only amounted to 1,538,000 in 1923.

⁵ The kingdom of 'Iraq and the Syro-Lebanese Union have been omitted from the second column as not being sovereign in practice during these years, although, as mandated territories of the 'A' class, their independence had been recognized provisionally.

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Before the War.

After the War.

(b) *East European States.*

Bulgaria.
Greece.
Serbia.

Esthonia.
Finland.
Latvia.
Lithuania.

(c) *Overseas States in the Temperate Zone.*

Chile.
Irish Free State.¹
New Zealand.
Uruguay.

(d) *Overseas States in the Tropical Zone.*²

Bolivia.
Ecuador.
Guatemala.
San Salvador.
Venezuela.

4. *States with less than one million of population.*³

(a) *West European States.*

Luxembourg.⁴

Luxembourg.⁴

(b) *East European States.*

Albania.
Montenegro.

Albania.

(c) *Overseas States in the Temperate Zone.*

Iceland.⁵

(d) *Overseas States in the Tropical Zone.*⁶

Costa Rica.
Honduras.
Nicaragua.⁷
Paraguay.

¹ Established as a member of the British Commonwealth with Dominion status under the Treaty of December, 1921, and admitted to Membership in the League of Nations on the 10th September, 1923.

² Omitting Cuba, Haiti, and Liberia as being virtually under the protectorate of the United States, although all three countries were admitted to Membership in the League of Nations, Cuba on the 8th March and the other two on the 30th June, 1920.

³ Omitting the 'A' class mandated state of Palestine.

⁴ Both before and after the War of 1914, Luxembourg was independent politically but not economically (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, II (i) 2).

⁵ For the relations between Iceland and Denmark, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, III (ii) 2 (a).

⁶ Omitting San Domingo and Panama as being virtually under the protectorate of the United States, although Panama was an original Member of the League of Nations.

⁷ The position of Nicaragua was peculiar. In 1913 she accepted a virtual protectorate by the United States, and in 1916 she granted to that Power

The results of the above comparison may be summed up as follows. Before the War of 1914 only sixteen lesser states were playing an active part in international affairs, and fifteen of these states lay in Europe, which was at that time almost the exclusive field of organized international relations in the political sphere, while the sixteenth lay half in Europe and half outside it. After the War, forty-seven lesser states were playing a similar part; and, of these forty-seven, twenty-two lay in Europe, three in the Middle East, one in the Far East, and the remaining twenty-one overseas—five of these being Dominions of the British Commonwealth and fifteen of them members of the American Entente.

One of the most significant features in the new map was the reappearance in the international system of states holding an intermediate position between the Great Powers and the minor states of 1914. Since the merger of Saxony, Bavaria, Sardinia, and the Two Sicilies in Germany and Italy and the deliberate withdrawal of Spain from active participation in international affairs after the Spanish-American War of 1898-9, pieces of this calibre, which had played so important a part during the previous four centuries, had been absent from the board. In January, 1920, however, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia were preparing to take up in Eastern Europe the role which the intermediate German and Italian states had played in Central Europe before 1871; and, in the international affairs of Europe during the period under review, the relations of these four states with one another and with their greater and smaller neighbours¹ were second only in importance to the relations between France and Germany. Moreover, the attraction of the overseas nations into the central current of international affairs had brought into action another state of this calibre in the shape of Brazil, who had previously moved almost entirely within the regional orbit of the American continent. In point of population, Brazil with her thirty millions and Poland with her twenty-seven millions²

the right to establish naval bases on her territory and to construct an inter-oceanic canal across it. On the other hand she continued to play an independent part in the international affairs of Central America (see the *Survey for 1925*), and she was admitted to Membership of the League of Nations in April, 1920.

¹ See Part III of the *Survey for 1920-3*.

² This was the estimated population of Poland within the frontiers fixed by the Treaties of Versailles and Riga, the award of the Council of the League in regard to Upper Silesia, and the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference on the 15th March, 1923. (See the *Survey for 1920-3*, III (ii) 3 (b) and (e).)

already stood half-way between Spain on the one hand and Italy and France on the other, and both might reasonably look forward to a more rapid rate of material development in the immediate future than either of those two Great Powers.

The mineral resources of Poland within the frontiers of 1923 were not incomparable to those of France, even after the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and the acquisition of the coal-mines in the Saar ; and Poland, unlike France, had a birthrate which would enable her to build up a great industrial population.¹ Brazil, again, possessed empty lands (sub-tropical on the coast but temperate on the plateau in the interior) which were capable of producing on a vast scale crops eagerly demanded by the industries of the world, and these empty lands were already attracting the surplus population of the Italian countryside. Thus France by her diplomatic and military support and Italy by her gifts of 'man-power' were building up Poland and Brazil into nations which bade fair to become their equals in material strength. In fact, the gulf between the Great Powers and the lesser states was being narrowed so rapidly that a distinction which had been of fundamental importance in international politics before the War might conceivably lose its meaning within the next generation.

Such statistics of population and material resources offer a convenient basis for the classification of states, but they are misleading unless they are considered in relation to the climate and situation of the countries and the qualities and capacities of the peoples (including those of prospective immigrants). Regarded from this broader point of view the intermediate and minor states in the world of 1920-3 fall into the five main groups which have been indicated in the preceding table—that is, into a West European group, an East European group, a Middle Eastern group, and two groups of states overseas—one in the Temperate and the other in the Tropical Zone.

The members of the West European group were Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. Before the War of 1914 each of these states had been sheltered to some extent by its geographical position ;² and, even in that

¹ Hitherto Poland had actually exported industrial workers as far afield as the Ruhr ; and, after the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, the French Government encouraged the Ruhr Poles to emigrate to the industrial districts of France.

² The Scandinavian and Peninsular states had been sheltered by their position at the two extremities of Western Europe, and Switzerland by her

war, only Belgium and Portugal had been belligerents and only Belgium and Denmark had changed their frontiers in the peace settlement—Belgium by the acquisition of Eupen and Malmédy,¹ and Denmark by the acquisition of the First Plebiscite Zone in Schleswig.² This time, however, they had all suffered acutely from the economic and social effects of the War; neutrality had lost its economic privileges; and the experience of Belgium had shown that this impoverished neutrality might be impossible to preserve if it conflicted with the strategy of a Great Power fighting for existence against Powers of its own calibre. The German invasion of Belgium had shattered the illusion of security which the peoples of these small West European states had cherished from 1815 to 1914, and the shock had transformed their outlook on international affairs. They now realized that an unambitious and inoffensive policy was not enough to secure immunity in a world from which the old economic and geographical barriers had almost disappeared, and they all took the decisive step of joining the League of Nations. As Members of the League they could play a more effective part in international politics than they had been able or willing to play at any time during the previous century. Their probable influence on its counsels could not be measured by their area or population. It would be enhanced considerably by their position in Western Europe; for Western Europe seemed likely to remain the home of Western culture long after it had lost its economic and political ascendancy in the world, and in the works of the spirit the smaller peoples of this region had never fallen behind their more powerful neighbours.

The Swiss city of Geneva, which had recently upheld its long tradition of enlightened international activities by rendering impartial service to prisoners of war through the *Croix Rouge Internationale*, had been designated as the seat of the League in Article 7 of the Covenant. The choice was also the natural culmination of the position which Switzerland had come to enjoy since the Treaty of Vienna in virtue of her guaranteed neutrality.³ The neutrality of Switzerland differed from that of Belgium in that it

mountains, while the Low Countries, which were physically exposed, were safeguarded politically by the very fact that their geographical position was so central, since their independence could not be destroyed without upsetting the whole equilibrium of Western Europe.

¹ *H. P. C.*, vol. ii, Ch. III.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, Ch. IV, Part 1.

³ For the whole question see the article by Manley O. Hudson in the *American Journal of International Law*, vol. xviii, No. 3, July, 1924.

was not a restriction of sovereignty imposed on the country against its will. It was an integral part of the Swiss Constitution, and it was by the desire of the Swiss themselves that it had been made a part of the international law of Europe. While the security of this neutrality had been diminished, its importance had been intensified during the War, when Switzerland had become a sort of clearing-house and common meeting-ground for all the belligerents; and so strongly was this felt in Switzerland that the Swiss themselves raised the point when the time came for them to apply for admission to the League of Nations. Article 16 of the Covenant imposed on all Members of the League the obligation under certain circumstances to take part in warlike operations and to give passage to foreign troops. In either case Switzerland, as a Member of the League of Nations, might be required to forfeit her position of permanent neutrality, and she made it a condition of joining the League that she should not be required to undertake these obligations. A legal basis for this demand was afforded by the fact that in Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles the guarantees of Swiss neutrality given in 1815 had been reaffirmed. In consequence the Council of the League, in February, 1920, passed a resolution recognizing that Switzerland was in a unique position and conceding that she should not be obliged to take part in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military operations within her territory. This was no mere academic point, and when an international force was being organized to watch over the carrying out of the plebiscite in the Vilna district,¹ the Federal Government refused, on the strength of it, to allow the passage of any part of the force through Switzerland.

A second group of lesser states, consisting of those situated in the Temperate Zone overseas, likewise possessed an importance which could not be measured by their present material strength. They enjoyed two special advantages, one economic and one political, which in combination would almost certainly raise them in time to the foremost rank. In the first place their virtual monopoly of rich, vacant territories with a temperate climate assured to them a steady inflow of European immigrants (especially now that the United States was beginning to close her doors, while the capacity of Europe to support a growing population had at least temporarily diminished). In the second place, their respective political relations with Great Britain and the United States, through the British

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, III (ii) 3 (b).

Commonwealth and the American 'regional understanding', ensured them against attack by land-hungry Powers of non-European race during their formative period; and they enjoyed all the advantages of this relationship with hardly any of the drawbacks which it might have involved. While they were just as independent as Poland or the Netherlands in the conduct of their internal affairs, in their economic and fiscal relations with other countries, and in their freedom to remain neutral when the United States or the United Kingdom were involved in war, they remained under the aegis of these two Great Powers, whose fleets, armies, and diplomacy were at their respective service if their fundamental interests were threatened by any third party. They were in the fortunate position of having secured independence without being compelled to pay the price of impotence and isolation.

The overseas states in the Tropical Zone likewise possessed these privileges of the second group, but without their prospects. Falling, as they did, within the American sphere, they enjoyed a sheltered freedom; but their native stock (which was only crossed to a small extent with European blood) showed less vitality and capacity for progress,¹ and there was no likelihood that it would be either improved or supplanted to any considerable extent by immigration from abroad. The Monroe Doctrine forbade the colonization and development of these countries by the surplus population of other civilized tropical regions like India, Malaya, or the southern provinces of China and Japan, while, except in a few highland areas, the climate was a barrier to the influx of immigrants from Europe. Left to their own resources, the majority of these states seemed condemned to stagnation or anarchy. Civil disorders, accompanied by great insecurity of life and property, were endemic in the Central-American area between the Panama Canal and the southern border of the United States;² and in Mexico—a country of nearly fourteen million people with great material resources and a magnificent situation at the meeting-point of two sub-continent and two oceans—these conditions might at any time give rise to serious international complications. The fate of Mexico was of peculiar concern to the

¹ At the time of the Spanish conquest, four centuries before, the peoples of the Mexican and Peruvian plateaux had possessed civilizations of their own, which they appear to have built up by their unaided efforts, but these civilizations were destroyed by the invaders, and this sudden and violent breach with the past seems to have incapacitated the descendants of the Aztecs and the Incas from putting life into the foreign civilization which their conquerors forced them to assume (see Lord Bryce, *South America*, Ch. XIII).

² See the *Survey for 1925*.

United States, which marched with Mexico along a land-frontier of 1,744 miles, extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so that Mexico controlled all the land-routes between the United States and the Canal Zone of Panama.¹

The East European group of states was at this moment the most interesting of the five, for it was a new and startling apparition upon the map of the world. In 1914 there had been six minor states in Eastern Europe² with a total population of hardly twenty-two millions and a total area which nowhere exceeded, and at one point³ fell short of, the area of Turkey-in-Europe within the frontiers of 1815. In 1920 the East European group consisted of thirteen states⁴ extending in a continuous belt from the Balkans to the Baltic, from the Adriatic to the Pripet Marshes, from the Erzgebirge to the Black Sea, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Aegean. Five of these states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, of which the first mentioned was now the largest of the whole group) had not existed in any form in 1914; three others (Austria, Hungary, and Finland) had existed, though with different frontiers, as component parts of two Great Powers;⁵ two more (Serbia and Rumania) had existed in embryo,⁶ but had been so greatly transformed and enlarged in the meantime that one of them (Serbia) had actually changed its name; only three out of the thirteen (Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria) had existed in 1914 with approximately the same frontiers that they possessed in 1920, and of these Albania was still only seven years old,⁷ while Greece, the oldest minor state in Eastern Europe, had not yet celebrated the centenary of the year in which her long war of independence began. In 1923, however, the aggregate population of these thirteen immature states was 104,000,000 (that is, approximately the same as the population of the United States of America), and something like 80,000,000 out of this immense multitude of people had been

¹ See the *Survey for 1925* for the relations between Mexico and the United States during the period under review.

² Excluding Turkey, whose holding in Europe had just been cut down to Eastern Thrace as a result of the Balkan War of 1912-13.

³ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had passed straight from the Ottoman Empire to Austria-Hungary.

⁴ Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, Finland.

⁵ The Austria and the Hungary of 1920 were the mutilated successors of the two former partners in the Dual Monarchy, while Finland had existed as an autonomous Grand Duchy under the Imperial Crown of Russia.

⁶ Serbia was the embryo of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or Yugoslavia, Rumania of Greater Rumania.

⁷ Albania had not become a state until 1913, after the Balkan War.

detached, since 1914, from the body-politic of the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov Empires. These great and sudden changes had temporarily plunged Eastern Europe into political and economic chaos; but, during the four years under review, the relationships between the thirteen East European states developed into two distinct systems—one centring round the western border of Soviet Russia and the other round the basin of the Danube. This process is traced in Part III of the following volume.

Even in January 1920 the chaos in Eastern Europe was not so great as that which prevailed in the Middle East, for in the Middle East the War lasted fully three years longer than in any other theatre¹ and spread to Afghanistan, a country which had held aloof as long as the fighting continued on the European fronts.² The general symptoms, however, were the same as those in the East European area. A Nationalism, based like East European Nationalism upon affinities of language, was unmistakably gaining ground; multi-national empires were breaking up; and a number of independent states were reappearing, or newly arising, in the former spheres of influence of certain Great Powers. Egypt, for example, was now in process of recovering the independence which she had lost since the Ottoman conquest in 1517, and was promising eventually to become a Power of the new intermediate calibre,³ while more conspicuous changes were taking place in those Arab territories in Asia which had previously been under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Here Nationalism, assisted by the policies of West European Powers, seemed to be achieving at one stroke the results which had demanded a century of effort in

¹ This can be seen from the following table of dates:

| <i>Peace Treaty.</i> | <i>Date of Signature.</i> | <i>Date of coming into Force.</i> |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| With Germany | 28 June, 1919 | 10 January, 1920 |
| With Austria | 10 September, 1919 | 16 July, 1920 |
| With Bulgaria | 27 November, 1919 | 9 August, 1920 |
| With Hungary | 4 June, 1920 | 26 July, 1921 |
| With Turkey | 24 July, 1923 | 6 August, 1924 |

² The Third Afghan War began on the 9th May, 1919. Peace was signed on the 8th August of the same year (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, IV (iv)).

³ The independence of Egypt was conditionally recognized by Great Britain on the 28th February, 1922, and Turkey waived the former rights of the Ottoman Empire over the country under the Treaty of Lausanne (Art. 17); but four fundamental questions concerning the relations of Egypt and Great Britain were reserved by Great Britain in February, 1922, for future settlement. The new status of Egypt was symbolized by the substitution of *Malik* (king) for *Sultan* (which implies a delegated authority) as the title of her sovereign.

the Balkan Peninsula ;¹ nine independent or potentially independent Arab states were now arising in this area ;² and the political map was visibly being transformed. In Persia and Afghanistan, on the other hand, the appearance of the map in 1920 gave no measure of the political changes that had actually occurred since 1914. While the frontiers here remained the same, the countries defined by them had become genuinely independent, instead of being absorbed piecemeal into the respective spheres of influence of the Russian and the British Empires. That process, which had been on the verge of completion in 1915,³ had been dramatically reversed by the effects of the second Russian Revolution of 1917. The Russian troops, which had been in unlawful occupation of Persian territory since 1909, then ebbed away beyond the frontiers ; and the attempt to draw the whole of Persia into the British orbit, under the Anglo-Persian agreement of the 9th August, 1919, was frustrated by the rising tide of national feeling in Persia itself and by the military intervention of the Soviet Government at a critical moment.⁴ Indeed, Great Britain not only failed to acquire Russia's inheritance in Persia but lost her own sphere of influence in attempting to spread her net more widely. At the same time she voluntarily surrendered that control over the foreign policy of Afghanistan which she had exercised by treaty since 1879. The signature of the Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaty of the 8th August, 1919, in connexion with which this important concession was made,⁵ and the denunciation of the Anglo-Persian agreement by the Persian

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part 3, which carries the narrative down to the end of 1922.

² The Imamate of San'a and the principality of the Idrisi in the Yemen, the Kingdom of the Hijaz along the west coast of the Peninsula, the Amirate of the Ibn Sa'ud family in Central and Eastern Arabia, the principality of Kuweyt, the Kingdom of 'Iraq, the mandated state of Palestine, the Amirate of Transjordan, and the French mandated area in Syria, which technically consisted of a Confederation of three Syrian states linked by a customs union with an independent state of Greater Lebanon. Ottoman sovereignty or suzerainty over the whole area covered by these nine states had been recognized by Great Britain in 1914, when the boundary between the Ottoman and the British sphere in Arabia had been mapped out by agreement from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. Starting from the north-west frontier of the Aden Protectorate, the line of demarcation had continued in a north-easterly direction and had then bent to the north in order to strike the Persian Gulf at a point east of the Qatar Peninsula.

³ In exchange for Great Britain's acquiescence in the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, Russia had agreed to the inclusion of the 'neutral zone' of Persia in the British sphere of influence. At the same time, she had announced her intention thenceforward to exercise 'full liberty of action' in her own sphere (*H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part 5).

⁴ See *H. P. C.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, IV (iv).

Government in June, 1921, marked the re-emergence of Afghanistan and Persia as fully sovereign and independent states at liberty to play their own part in international affairs.

Middle Eastern Nationalism was of the militant order, and it did not hesitate to try conclusions with the Great Powers which had been victorious in the European theatres of war. Whereas Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria lay prostrate after the Armistice and signed under duress the terms dictated to them by the Allies, the Egyptians rose against the British régime in March, 1919; Afghanistan made war on the British Empire in May, 1919; the Turks organized an armed resistance to the Greek invasion of Anatolia in the early summer of the same year (though the Greeks were then acting as agents of the Principal Allied Powers); the tribesmen of Iraq rose against the British army of occupation in July, 1920; and the army of the Arab National State in Syria ventured, in the same month, to try conclusions with a French army in the field. It was significant that almost all these apparently reckless appeals to force were eventually more or less justified by their political results, and this whether they were successful or not from the military point of view. The triumph of Turkish Nationalism, recorded in the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, was of course the fruit of a sustained military effort crowned by a brilliant victory. On the other hand, the rebellion in Iraq, which collapsed after six months, was followed none the less by the abandonment of direct British administration and the establishment of a national Government under British guidance. Afghanistan, again, obtained her release from British control after being ingloriously defeated by Great Britain in a war in which Afghanistan had been the aggressor, while the short and sharp repression of the Egyptian rising was followed, slowly but surely, by the recognition of Egyptian independence. By the close of 1923 the appeal to force had apparently promoted the cause of national sovereignty and independence in every Middle Eastern country except Syria, where General Gouraud's military victory of July, 1920, had not been followed by political concessions; but, after the successive gains of Nationalism in the three surrounding countries of Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt, it seemed unlikely that France could keep the movement at bay for long in so small and isolated an enclave as her mandated territory.

In outline, these were the principal changes in the map of the world between 1914 and the beginning of the year 1920.

(iv) The Horizon

1. THE RELATIONS OF STATES

The changes in the distribution of territory which had so greatly transformed the map of the world between 1914 and 1920 implied an even more important change in the invisible map of international relationships. Not only had the fortunes of particular states risen or fallen, but the former order of international society had disappeared. The changes in the territorial map had been brought about by the violent dissolution of that Concert of the Powers which had been maintained from 1815 to 1914 and which had made a perceptible advance, during the hundred years of its existence, towards an organized supervision of the political affairs of the world.¹ The schism of 1914, which had ranged all the Powers in one or other of two hostile camps, had greatly weakened their position both individually and as a body. This fact was represented on the territorial map by the relative increase in the holdings of independent states of lesser calibre and the relative shrinkage in the domain of the centralized empires. In the sphere of international government, it showed itself in the failure of either group of belligerents to secure the ascendancy and assume the functions which the undivided Concert had possessed before. That Germany should fail to establish her sole ascendancy was in accordance with the Western tradition; all the precedents were unfavourable to her success; but the joint failure of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers was unusual and therefore significant.

In spite of the overwhelming military and economic superiority which this group of Powers had appeared to possess at the moment of the Armistice in November, 1918, their joint authority in January, 1920, extended over a somewhat narrow radius beyond their own

¹ The Concert had been enlarged between 1815 and 1914 by the successive admittance of Italy, the United States, and Japan, but never interrupted by a general war in which all the Powers were engaged. There had only been two wars involving three Powers at once (the Crimean War, between Russia, France, Great Britain, and Sardinia, at a time when Sardinia still ranked as a minor state, and the Austro-Prusso-Italian War of 1866) and in both instances a sufficient number of Powers had remained neutral to maintain continuity and to represent the Concert until peace between the other Powers was restored. In the Austro-Franco-Sardinian War of 1859, the Austro-Prusso-Danish War of 1864, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, not more than two of the states respectively involved were Great Powers. Wars involving one Great Power only, like the Spanish-American War of 1898-9 or the South African War of 1899-1901, were comparatively frequent.

borders. At that date they were still in effective control of the European territories left by the Peace Treaties to Germany and Austria ; of the former German possessions overseas in Africa and the Pacific ; of the Arab provinces previously belonging to the Ottoman Empire ; and of the Black Sea Straits.¹ Their principal efforts were directed towards Germany. They were in military occupation of all German territories west of the Rhine ; of three bridgeheads beyond the river ; of the Allenstein, Marienwerder, and Upper Silesian districts (besides the Klagenfurt district in Austria) in which plebiscites were to be taken ; and also of Memel and Danzig. The military establishment of Germany was under Allied inspection and control, and the German *Reich* was so impotent that it had been compelled to sign and ratify a Treaty dictated by the Allies without being permitted to negotiate upon the terms presented to it. So far as Germany was concerned the authority of the victorious Powers was at this time effective, but the task of holding down a country which had been the strongest member of their class had left the victors a slender margin of energy for other commitments, and in January, 1920, their authority over Allied, ex-Allied, or ex-enemy states outside the limits indicated was already precarious. In Eastern Europe and the Middle East, especially, the local states were acting on their own initiative, and the most that the Allies were able to do was to incline the balance between them by throwing into the scales the uncertain weight of their disfavour or approval. This indirect method of action was not without effect ; but the results of such intervention, though historically important, were largely beyond control, and the resolution of the forces engaged was ultimately determined by the laws of chance. The conflict between 'Whites' and 'Reds' in Russia and the conflict between Greeks and Turks in Anatolia were the two local disturbances in which the Allied Powers had taken the most active part, and in both fields their policy was to be frustrated by the eventual discomfiture of the party to which they had given their support.

Thus, in January, 1920, the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers was not proving a satisfactory substitute for the defunct Concert of the Powers in those regions where the War had produced the greatest dislocation, and where the need for some constructive principle of international law and order was proportionately great.

¹ The last Allied troops had left Archangel on the 27th September and Murmansk on the 12th October, 1919.

Even, moreover, within the limits to which it had been already confined, this authority was likely, for more than one reason, to be transitory.

In the first place the privileged status of the Powers could hardly be preserved unless it were shared by all of them, and this axiom had been recognized by the collective wisdom of their statesmen on previous occasions when an aggressive Power or Powers had been defeated by a coalition. France, for example, had been shielded against the retributive impulse of her opponents in 1815 and in 1713 by the counter-balancing consideration that she, too, was one of the Lord's anointed, and that her excessive humiliation would strike, indirectly, at the prestige of every other Great Power. The most remarkable application of this political philosophy had been the treatment of France after the last general war before that of 1914. As soon as France had overthrown the military government of Napoleon and had ceded to the Allies as a body the territories which she had conquered by force beyond the frontiers of 1792, she was admitted to the Conference which was to assign these territories to other sovereignties, and the Concert was thus restored without waiting for the final settlement.¹ There was no restoration of the kind after the War of 1914. In January, 1920, Germany remained under a ban, though she had changed her government, ceded the territories, and undertaken to pay the reparation demanded from her. So far from being readmitted to the Concert, she had been compelled, in the text of the Peace Treaty, to acknowledge a unilateral responsibility for the War. Austria-Hungary, again, while she had incurred less odium than Germany, could not be readmitted because she had ceased to exist ; and meanwhile the Allied and Associated group of Powers was not only omitting to broaden its basis by the reconciliation of its late adversaries but was actually being depleted by the secession of its own members. Russia had already been swept out of the Entente by the currents of defeat and revolution ; in January, 1920, the *de facto* Government of Great Russia (including the two capitals) was actually if not formally at war with the ex-allies of the Russian Empire ; and the United States, whose intervention had redressed the military balance in 1917 and had enabled the Allies to win the War, was at this moment deliberately withdrawing from the political

¹ It is remarkable that this policy was not reversed after the interruption of the Hundred Days and that France was formally admitted to the Quadruple Alliance of the victors in 1818.

affairs of Europe and the Middle East,¹ in which the intervention of the Allied and Associated group of Powers or of some other international authority was particularly demanded by the prevailing disorder. Japan, on her part, had consistently held aloof from European and Middle Eastern questions, and thus, for the purposes of action in this area, the membership of the group had been reduced, in effect, to France, Italy, and Great Britain. Two of these Powers, again, were concentrating their attention upon limited objectives of their own—France upon security and reparation, and Italy upon ascendancy in the Adriatic. Instead of acting like ‘World Powers’ and framing their policy with a view to the world as a whole, they were narrowing their vision to a horizon which hardly extended beyond the boundaries of their immediate neighbours. The responsibilities of the former Concert thus threatened to fall with crushing weight upon Great Britain, for the world-wide distribution of British territories and British commercial interests compelled the British Commonwealth, or at any rate the United Kingdom, to take a comparatively broad view in international affairs; but it was evident that Great Britain could not assume such responsibility single-handed.

The second danger which threatened the joint ascendancy of the victors was a reversal of alliances—a phenomenon which had occurred repeatedly as a sequel to previous decisive wars, and which was an almost inevitable corollary to any international system based on the conception of the Balance of Power. Granted that a balance is possible, that it has actually existed, and that it has then been overturned, it is exceedingly unlikely that it will be readjusted to a nicety by so violent and haphazard an operation as war; and when a war fought to preserve a balance has ended in the decisive victory of one coalition over another, the position of the Powers in either group will have altered relatively not only to their late opponents but to one another. If equilibrium is to be restored, the balance unduly inclined in a new direction by the decisive destruction or defeat of one group can only be weighted to its proper level by the distribution of the victorious Powers between the two scales; and if the doctrine of the balance is held

¹ The policy of the United States at this time was to withdraw from a particular region, but not by any means to retire altogether into her special American sphere of interest to which the ‘regional understanding’ of the Monroe Doctrine applied. Both the Administration and public opinion continued to take an active interest in the affairs of the Pacific and of the Far East, in which they felt that American interests were directly concerned.

with sufficient conviction by the statesmen and the peoples of the victorious countries, this redistribution may take place almost automatically. The self-adjustment of the balance had been the determining factor in practical politics in 1914 and for the previous two or three hundred years,¹ and this pointed in 1920 to some reversal in the relations between the several Great Powers which had survived the recent War. Two particular reorientations of the first importance were already the subject of speculation: a *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia and a loosening of the tie between Great Britain and France.

Russia and Germany might be drawn together by the consequences of common defeat. Presumably both Powers would be eager to upset a peace settlement which had been made without their concurrence although largely at their expense, and the prizes for which they had formerly competed would no longer be a cause of contention between them now that they had fallen into the hands of other parties. The Hapsburg Monarchy, whose inheritance in South-Eastern Europe Germany and Russia had each coveted, had been cut to pieces by the sword of Nationalism, and the same blade had bitten deep into the flesh of both the rival heirs. The strength of their new common interest could be measured by the aggrandizement of the reconstituted Republic of Poland. In attaining the frontiers laid down in the Treaties of Versailles and Riga,

¹ The following examples of the reversal of alliances are characteristic: (i) *The series of Anglo-Dutch Wars between 1652 and 1674*, after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) had removed the last prospect of a Spanish hegemony. For the previous three-quarters of a century the English and the Dutch, though they had frequently come into acute conflict in their competition for overseas trade, had been united in Europe by their common struggle against the preponderance of Spain, and from 1674 onwards they co-operated once more against the threatened preponderance of France. (ii) *The change of partners which France made in 1755*, when she abandoned Prussia (one of the Protestant states of the Holy Roman Empire, which it had been the policy of France to support since the Thirty Years' War) in favour of the Hapsburg Monarchy (her traditional rival). The war of 1742-8, in which France and Prussia had been in alliance against Austria, had shown that Prussia was on the point of superseding Austria as the leading Power in Central Europe, and the policy of France at once reacted to this disturbance of the previous balance. (iii) *The change in the relationship between Great Britain and France after 1815*. From 1689 to 1815 Great Britain had been the most constant and formidable adversary of France, whereas between 1815 and 1920 the two countries had never once been at war with one another and had fought in two European wars on the same side. This reorientation was effected before the settlement after the general War of 1792-1815 had been completed. During the Conference of Vienna, Great Britain, Austria, and France aligned themselves against Russia and Prussia over the questions of Saxony and Poland, and actually entered into a secret defensive alliance in case the divergence of views on these questions might lead to war.

Poland had severed all direct contact overland not only between Russia and Germany but between the main body of Germany and East Prussia, and had brought under her sovereignty German, White Russian, and Ukrainian minorities which probably amounted collectively to as much as 33 per cent. of her total population.

Conversely, Great Britain and France might be expected in the light of the precedents to drift apart now that their common fear of Germany had been removed. In 1904, when the progress of Germany as a World Power, on sea and land, had been the chief preoccupation of both Powers in the field of international affairs, they had been ready to compromise their outstanding differences for the sake of co-operation. In 1920, when Germany was prostrate, the prospect that she might eventually join forces with Russia in order to reverse the recent changes in Eastern Europe was regarded in France and England with a very different degree of apprehension. To the French mind, any menace to the new map of Eastern Europe was an indirect but undoubted menace to the restored Eastern frontier of France herself. A successful attack by Germany and Russia upon the new East European states would not only upset the redistribution of military power on the Continent which had been achieved with such labour since the Armistice of 1918; it might result in uniting in a single military combination all Europe east of the Alps and the Rhine, and this would place France in a position of greater inferiority, and much greater isolation, than that in which she had found herself in 1914. In 1920, therefore, the first object of French policy was to preserve the new political map of Europe as an indivisible whole.¹ The British people, on the other hand, with their world-wide preoccupations, did not take so comprehensive a view as France of the continental European field, and while Great Britain might contemplate intervening a second time, as she had intervened in 1914, in case the land frontiers of France and Belgium themselves were to be threatened at some future date by direct aggression on the part of Germany, she was most unwilling to undertake any special commitments, beyond the Covenant of the League, on behalf of newly established states at the other end of Europe whose policy might be adventurous and whose economic position was unstable. Great Britain's primary

¹ See the exposition of this policy by the French Ambassador at the Court of St. James's in a conversation with Lord Curzon in December, 1921, as reported in a dispatch to the British Ambassador in Paris (British Blue Book, *Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact*, Cmd. 2169 of 1924, No. 32).

interest on the European Continent was neither security nor reparation but the recovery of her trade, and that required the economic rehabilitation of Germany—the ‘central support’ round which ‘the rest of the European economic system’ had grouped itself in 1914,¹ and the principal continental customer and source of supply for Great Britain before the War. The paralysis or destruction of the German economic system could not be compensated, in readjusting the balance of international trade, by the distribution of German economic assets to France and Poland. The new possessors might never succeed in building the fragments into a system of their own; in any case the process would probably take many years; and, at the end of it, the industrial efficiency of the Continent, and therefore its capacity for the profitable exchange of goods and services, might still stand appreciably lower than in 1914. In this inevitable difference of attitude towards Germany the possibility of a divergence between French and British policy was already latent in January, 1920. At the same time the relations between the two Governments had been strained since 1915 by a series of petty but exasperating conflicts of interest in the Middle East—a region which had not been included in the scope of the general settlement between the two Powers in 1904, although it had been the scene of rivalries between them for more than a century past. These dormant rivalries had been reawakened by the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in Asia which had followed upon the Turkish Government’s intervention in the War, and by the beginning of 1920 the disagreement between Great Britain and France on the Middle Eastern Question, coinciding with their disagreement on the more important issues in Europe, was beginning to prejudice the cordiality which had distinguished their relations during the previous sixteen years.

Thus, in January, 1920, there was little prospect of reconstructing that Concert of the Powers which had supervised international affairs with considerable success from 1815 to 1914. A majority of its former members had disappeared by voluntary withdrawal or forcible expulsion, or by their obliteration from the political map, and the mutual relations of the rest were becoming unstable. The Concert had broken up; a new system of international relationships was demanded by the new conditions of the world; and the sense of this great void in international organization, which had been troubling the minds of the statesmen, publicists, and religious

¹ J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, p. 14.

leaders of Western society since the early stages of the War, had found expression during the Peace Conference in the establishment of the League of Nations, which came into action on the 10th January, 1920, with the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

The main practical functions which the League would have to fulfil had been foreshadowed by General Smuts twelve months before.

The question [he had written in December 1918] is what new political form shall be given to these elements of our European civilization? On the answer to that question depends the future of Europe and of the world. My broad contention is that the smaller, embryonic, unsuccessful leagues of nations have been swept away, not to leave an empty house for national individualism or anarchy but for a larger and better League of Nations. Europe is being liquidated, and the League of Nations must be the heir to this great estate. The peoples left behind by the decomposition of Russia, Austria, and Turkey are mostly untrained politically; many of them are either incapable of or deficient in power of self-government; they are mostly destitute and will require much nursing towards economic and political independence. If there is going to be a scramble among the victors for this loot, the future of Europe must indeed be despaired of. The application of the spoils system at this most solemn juncture in the history of the world, a repartition of Europe at a moment when Europe is bleeding at every pore as a result of partitions less than half a century old, would indeed be incorrigible madness on the part of rulers, and enough to drive the torn and broken peoples of the world to that despair of the State which is the motive power behind Russian Bolshevism. Surely the only statesmanlike course is to make the League of Nations the reversionary in the broadest sense of these Empires. In this *débâcle* of the old Europe the League of Nations is no longer an outsider or stranger but the natural master of the house. It becomes naturally and obviously the solvent for a problem which no other means will solve. . . .

The vital principles are: the principle of nationality involving the ideas of political freedom and equality; the principle of autonomy, which is the principle of nationality extended to peoples not yet capable of complete independent statehood; the principle of political decentralization, which will prevent the powerful nationality from swallowing the weak autonomy as has so often happened in the now defunct European Empires; and finally an institution like the League of Nations, which will give stability to that decentralization and thereby guarantee the weak against the strong. The only compromise I make, and make partly to conciliate the Great Powers and partly in view of the administrative inexperience of the League at the beginning, is the concession that, subject to the authority and control of the League, which I mean to be real and effective, suitable Powers may be appointed to act as mandatories of the League in the more backward peoples and areas. That compromise will, I hope, prove to be only a temporary expedient.

Let no one be alarmed at this formidable list of first-class difficulties which I am lavishly scattering in the path of the League. All these matters and many more are rapidly, unavoidably becoming subjects for international handling. Questions of industry, trade, finance, labour, transit, and communications, and many others, are bursting through the national bounds and are clamouring for international solution. Water-tight compartments and partition walls between the nations and the continents have been knocked through, and the new situation calls for world-government. If the League of Nations refuses to function, some other machinery will have to be created to deal with the new problems which transcend all national limits. The task is there ; all that is required is a carefully thought-out form of government by which that task could be undertaken. It is a unique problem, both in its magnitude and in the benefits for the world which a successful solution will secure. . . .

During the twelve months that had passed since these words were written, the Covenant of the League of Nations had been drafted at Paris and incorporated in the text of the Treaty of Versailles.¹ Upon the ratification of the Treaty on the 10th January, 1920, the mechanism of the League came into operation, and on the 16th January the Council met for the first time to inaugurate a new order of international society.² The possible import of this event for the future of Mankind could not be measured by the impression which it made at the time upon the public imagination. At that moment the Covenant was overshadowed in men's minds by the redistribution of territory and the provisions for reparation, and the supposed settlement of the concrete issues raised by the War was taken more seriously than an untried scheme for permanent reconstruction and security. Yet in view of the conservatism, the narrowness of horizon, and the aversion from abstract ideas which are characteristic at all times of Mankind in the mass, and which were accentuated in 1920 by the psychological effect of the War, it was remarkable that the Covenant should have found a place in the Treaty at all ; and the comparative obscurity of the atmosphere in which the League entered upon its activities was not necessarily to its disadvantage. Public sympathy and support might be acquired step by step, if the League were not swept away by some sudden assault of panic or fanaticism in the first stages of its growth ; and in 1920 the founders and well-wishers of the League might privately rejoice to see the passions aroused by the

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. VI, Part 1, 'The Making of the Covenant.'

² For a calendar of the sessions of the League of Nations Council and Assembly during the first four years of their existence, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, I (iii) 1.

War still spending themselves upon concrete issues which the movement of history, bearing the League upon its current, would sooner or later leave stranded and forgotten.

What, at this time, was the prospect, on that longer view, that the new mechanism of the League would work and that the letter of the Covenant would be informed by the spirit necessary to salvation? The first objection advanced by sceptics at this time was that the membership of the League was fatally incomplete. Public opinion in the United States had declared decidedly against participation; the ex-enemy nations had not yet been invited to join, and their admission required the assent of two-thirds of the Assembly; and finally the Soviet Government of Russia was not only being treated by most of the original Members of the League on the same footing as the ex-enemy states but was itself repudiating the League, from its own very different standpoint, as vigorously as the United States. Indeed, it was taking active steps, through propaganda abroad, to establish a rival order of society in the form of the 'Third International'. Thus seven states had definitely been placed, or had placed themselves, outside the pale, three of which (namely, the United States, Germany, and Russia) were of the calibre of Great Powers, while one of them (the United States) was the wealthiest and strongest Power left in existence after the War.

To such criticism it might be replied that by December, 1920, the League already embraced the great majority of the self-governing nations, including two ex-enemy states,¹ and forty-four out of those fifty-seven intermediate and minor states which, collectively, were so prominent a feature in the new map of the world.² Moreover, this majority was united in support of the international order which the League represented, whereas the non-Members were partly being excluded against their will by a policy which it was open to the Members to reverse and were partly holding aloof for motives so diverse that any hostile or rival combination between them was inconceivable. The League, on this showing, might reasonably consider that time was on its side, and that the present gaps in its membership were not an incurable weakness if the existing Members remained loyal to the Covenant and to one another. To ensure this, two conditions were essential: first, the organization

¹ Austria and Bulgaria, both admitted on the 16th December, 1920.

² The following states of this class were not yet Members of the League on the 1st January, 1921: Hungary, Turkey, Mexico, Abyssinia, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Egypt, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Afghanistan, Iceland, and the yet unborn Irish Free State.

of the League must respect the traditional susceptibilities of sovereign states in general and Great Powers in particular; and, secondly, there must be a certain homogeneity of type, structure, and outlook among the Members.

The first condition had been fulfilled in the constitution of the Assembly and the Council. The delegates on both bodies represented governments and not electorates; and the 'equality' of sovereign states was implicitly recognized by the provision that each state represented on either body should have a single vote, and that, on both bodies, the unanimity of all states represented should be required 'except where otherwise expressly provided'.¹ At the same time the framers of the Covenant, in safeguarding the sovereignty of all members alike, had not ignored the *de facto* preponderance of the Great Powers.² Under Article 4 the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers were to be represented permanently on the Council of the League, and they were also to be in a permanent majority of one over the four other states which were to be selected, from time to time, for representation on the Council at the discretion of the Assembly. This arrangement reassured the Powers without excluding the intermediate and minor

¹ The important exceptions were that only a two-thirds majority of the Assembly was required for the admission of a new Member (Art. 1) and a bare (amended in 1921 to a three-quarters) majority of the Assembly (though a unanimous vote of the Council) for an amendment to the Covenant (Art. 26). Even so, the prevailing requirement of unanimity might seem at first sight to be a step backward from the constitution of the Postal Union, which was framed in 1874 and which became the general standard for the international organizations of an economic character which were founded between that date and 1914. In the Congress of the Postal Union, unanimity was in no case required, and 'a majority vote of the delegates was sufficient to secure the amendment of any clause of the Convention and the Règlement or the insertion of a new clause' (L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, p. 192). The difference was, of course, that the Postal Union and the other economic organizations were breaking new ground in which the traditional susceptibilities regarding sovereignty had not struck root, whereas the League of Nations was an attempt to secure co-operation between sovereign states in the very field where the sense of sovereignty was most strongly developed and where the fundamental interests of sovereign states were at stake.

² This was the mistake which had stultified the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. In these Conferences the requirement of unanimity was no doubt unavoidable, since the agenda were those political questions of war and peace with which the idea of sovereignty was traditionally bound up. At The Hague, however, this concession to sovereignty had not been supplemented by any arrangement for the special representation of the Great Powers, though in 1899 and 1907 the actual predominance of the Great Powers' interests in matters of peace and war was far greater than in 1920, when some of the intermediate states represented on the League (e. g. Yugoslavia and Poland) were military Powers of almost the first class—at any rate to judge by the size of their military establishments on a peace footing.

states from the highest organ of the League—an exclusion which would have stamped them as an inferior class. A further clause introduced that measure of elasticity which was demanded by the temporary effacement of Germany and Russia, two of the potentially strongest Powers, and by the rise of intermediate states which might grow to the calibre of Powers in the next generation.¹ The wisdom of these arrangements was proved by the sequel, for in less than three years the preponderance of representation on the Council had passed from the permanent to the non-permanent Members without any apparent detriment to the stability of the League.²

At the same time the preponderance of the minor states over the Great Powers in the Assembly was to some extent balanced by the fact that, among these states, the British Dominions were themselves offshoots of a Great Power, with whom they remained in partnership after they had secured practical though not juridical independence. The grant of separate Membership in the League to the British Dominions was a striking juridical innovation;³ and, in Article 1 of the Covenant, a door had been opened for other Powers to follow this precedent in the provision that 'any fully self-governing Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex' might become a Member of the League on the same terms as any fully self-governing state. This principle had been partially anticipated in the constitution of the Postal Union, which had allowed separate representation in the Postal Congress to dominion or colonial postal administrations; and not only the British Empire but France, Germany, and the United States had increased their voting power by taking advantage of this privilege.⁴ In the Postal

¹ 'With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose representatives shall always be Members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council. [The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility]' (Art. 4 of the Covenant as supplemented in 1921).

² The abstention of the United States left the numbers equal, while the number of non-permanent Members was raised to six by a decision of the Council on the 19th September, 1922. If Germany and Russia were subsequently to be admitted, the representation of the two classes would again become equal, but the Great Powers would not even then recover that majority of votes which they had received at the beginning.

³ For details regarding the status of the British Dominions in the League, see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 346-7 and 362-4.

⁴ See L. S. Woolf, *op. cit.*, p. 199. The British Empire had in this way obtained eight votes in the Postal Congress, France three, and the United States and Germany two apiece; and the British Dominions separately

Union 'full self-government', which was hardly relevant to the Union's sphere of activity, was not demanded; but its indispensability as a qualification for separate representation on the Assembly of the League was self-evident;¹ and as the political importance of the Assembly increased, this proviso would become an increasing incentive towards devolution for those surviving Powers which had not yet begun to follow the British example. Through the experience of the League, the overseas principle of partnership might come to be regarded as the secret of strength in international affairs instead of the continental principle of centralization, which had been the ideal of six out of the eight Powers in 1914 and which still retained adherents in 1920, notwithstanding the lessons of the War.

The 'mandatory system' for the government of the ex-German colonies, which had been suggested by Mr. George Louis Beer² in 1918, had also been included in the constitution of the League, and here again the Great Powers were not the sole beneficiaries. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand were to receive mandates in their own right as well as Great Britain, France, and Japan, and these lesser states and Japan had already prevailed upon the Peace Conference to draft their mandates on the 'C' model, which gave the mandatory greater administrative latitude than was allowed, under the Tropical African and Middle Eastern mandates, to Great Britain and France themselves. At the same time General Smuts's proviso that 'the authority and control of the League' over the mandatories should be 'real and effective' had been met in Article 22 of the Covenant by the provision for a Permanent Mandates Commission to advise the Council. Through this organ the League was to make arduous but on the whole successful efforts to assert its constitutional rights and to fulfil its constitutional duties during the following years.³ It was established from the

represented (unlike the separately represented colonies of any other Power) had already exercised in this body that right to vote in the opposite sense to the United Kingdom which they proceeded to exercise in the Assembly of the League.

¹ Otherwise, any state might have attempted to pack the Assembly with its nominees by subdividing the territories under its own immediate sovereignty. The requirement of full self-government ensured that new Members arising out of the dominions of Great Powers should not be merely the passive agents of their sponsors, and also that the process of devolution should not go beyond a certain limit, since full self-government in the modern world presupposed a minimum extent of territory and a minimum number of population.

² See *George Louis Beer* (New York, 1924, Macmillan Co.), p. 86.

³ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. VI, Part 4, 'The Mandatory System'; and the *Survey for 1920-3*, V (iv).

outset¹ that the individuals composing the Commission represented the Council of the League and not the respective states of which they happened to be nationals, and this principle was emphasized by the appointment of a Swiss citizen to be Secretary of the Commission and permanent Director of the Mandates Section in the Secretariat of the League. At their first meeting in 1921 the Commission grappled with the vital problem of the national status of native and non-native citizens of mandated territories, and at their second meeting, in July 1922, they laid it down that the native inhabitants of 'B' and 'C' (as well as 'A') mandated territories should enjoy a separate national status and should not acquire automatically the nationality of the mandatory Power. This ruling, which was not challenged by the mandatories concerned, would ensure, if upheld, that 'mandates' should not be transformed, like 'protectorates' and 'spheres of influence', into instruments of annexation; and, by settling the juridical question, it would give the Mandates Commission the time to assert their constitutional powers with effect.

While the susceptibilities of the Member States had thus been conciliated, had the necessary degree of homogeneity between them been secured? A certain homogeneity, in respect of the particular purpose to be served, is essential to any association between either individuals or communities. The makers of the American Constitution had recognized this important truth when they insisted that all states adhering to the Union must maintain a republican government, and the recognition was likewise implicit in the very title of the new world-organization, which called itself specifically a 'League of Nations' and not merely a 'League of States'. Since statehood was nevertheless a condition of membership, it followed that the League was to consist of national states, and that this category was considered to cover all the existing states in the world. Was this assumption borne out by the map of the world in 1920? It would certainly have been in flagrant contradiction with the map of 1914. For example, the Government of the non-Hungarian member of the Dual Monarchy at that date would probably have refused on principle to admit that its subjects were collectively an 'Austrian' nation, and, if it had committed itself to that view, it would at once have been contradicted in no measured language by at least two-thirds of the deputies in the *Reichsrat* at Vienna. Nor would Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, or Rumania

¹ The Mandates Commission came into being on the 1st December, 1920.

have been willing to enter into the Covenant of the League of Nations with either Austria or Hungary within the frontiers of 1914, or with the Dual Monarchy as a whole, for to do so would have been tantamount to the moral surrender of their unsatisfied national claims, and would have imposed a juridical obligation not to pursue those claims by making war with intent to change the *status quo*. Greece, for similar reasons, would have refused to enter into the Covenant with the Ottoman Empire and—most serious obstacle of all—it would have been psychologically impossible for France to recognize that the territories which she had lost in 1871 had been incorporated legitimately in Germany's national domain. Even if it had been feasible to form a league between the existing states, the non-representation of Poland, Ireland, and Bohemia would have been a standing reproach to the several Powers which at that time claimed to represent these submerged but unreconciled members of Western society. In 1914 the states of the world were so heterogeneous that the political map was dangerously unstable. In Europe, at any rate, most states were prepared, at the first favourable opportunity, either to upset the *status quo* by taking up arms or to confirm it by a 'preventive war', while every submerged nationality was hoping and striving to rise from the dead and to recover its statehood sooner or later by the successful exercise of force.

Had the environment changed sufficiently by 1920 to make a stable League of Nations possible? If the League was to be founded on nationality, its stability would depend partly on the extent to which that principle had triumphed in the territorial changes of the past six years, and partly upon whether it was likely to remain the accepted basis for the political map of the world. It augured well for the League that the results of the War of 1914 had been broadly favourable to the national principle. In Western Europe, where nationality rested not on language but on tradition, the War had preserved or restored the traditional distribution of territory.¹

¹ Belgium and Switzerland, the two classical examples of the non-linguistic national state, had both survived the War, although the Germans had attempted during their occupation of Belgium to drive a wedge between Flemings and Walloons by the administrative separation of their territories, while the national unity of the French and German-speaking Swiss had been strained by their respective sympathy for France and Germany. France, again, had recovered her traditional frontier against Germany, which was much farther removed from the linguistic boundary than the frontier of 1871–1918. The most characteristic frontier in Western Europe was that between France and Belgium, which had no linguistic, geographical, or economic justification but had been determined solely by the fortunes of war

In the countries settled by Western colonists overseas, the new nations created by new territorial associations had received recognition through the admission to the League of the Latin-American Republics and the British Dominions. In Central Europe, where linguistic nationalism had taken its rise between 1815 and 1871, the political and linguistic maps still coincided approximately in 1920. The frontiers of Italy had not been extended far beyond the linguistic boundary in sectors where they had fallen short of it before the War, and the frontiers of Germany had not been cut back far behind the linguistic boundary in sectors where they had overshot it. In Eastern Europe, in the meantime, the linguistic principle had mightily prevailed and had brought into existence a numerous group of new national states in a region previously occupied by a few multi-national and anti-national empires; while in the Middle East the wave of linguistic nationalism was still advancing, though in 1920 the strength of its impetus in this area had not yet been revealed nor its ultimate victory recognized as inevitable. Even in those former territories of the Russian Empire which were controlled by the Soviet Government of Moscow, the principle of linguistic nationality was being put into practice under a régime which theoretically rejected nationality as a *bourgeois* institution and recognized no political groups except the social classes. The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, as it was eventually organized under the constitution of the 15th July, 1923, was linked, in a political union, with three other Soviet Republics,¹ one of which was a Confederation of three autonomous states;² and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic itself contained nine autonomous republics and twelve autonomous districts marked off as enclaves from the main body of Great Russia. This elaborate redistribution of ex-Imperial Russian territories was based on the

between 1672 and 1713; yet this frontier had not been questioned since 1815. The only territorial change in Western Europe which had been made on grounds of language or self-determination in the settlement of 1919 was the transfer of the First Plebiscite Zone in Schleswig from Germany to Denmark. The assignment of Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium was justified, if at all, on the historical ground that they had belonged to the Spanish and Austrian Netherlands before 1792. It was significant, however, that the linguistic conflict in Belgium between the Flemings and Walloons, which the Germans had vainly attempted to exploit for their own ends, had broken out again spontaneously, and with renewed vigour, after the general election of November, 1919.

¹ The Ukrainian, the White Russian, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics.

² The Transcaucasian Federal Soviet Republic, composed of the Azerbaijan, Georgian, and Armenian Soviet Republics.

linguistic groups into which the population was divided, and the internal frontiers were drawn with considerable intricacy in order to make the political units coincide as nearly as possible with the linguistic areas. When the internal map of the Soviet Union in 1923 is compared with that of the Russian Empire in 1914, in which nationality was deliberately disregarded in the interests of uniformity and centralization, the recognition accorded to the principle of devolution during the interval reveals itself as a victory for the national idea.¹ Finally, both India and China were original Members of the League, and the spirit of nationality was making a visible impression upon their vast, ancient, and complex polities, though in 1920 it was too early to conjecture whether the 305,730,000² inhabitants of India or the 400,000,000 of China would eventually become nations in anything like the Western sense.³

These gains to the cause of nationality were indisputable. It might still be questioned, however, whether they sufficed, so far as they went, to make the new map of the world a stable basis for a League which not only identified itself in a general way with the national principle but committed its Members, under Article 10 of the Covenant, 'to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League'. The Devil's Advocate could show another side of the picture. He could present a list of entire nationalities still submerged⁴ and of substantial minorities un-

¹ See the text and maps of the Foreign Office Publication, *Soviet Russia : A Description of the various Political Units existing on Russian Territory*. It may be objected that this reorganization, devolution, and recognition of nationality had only taken place on paper ; that in reality all the territories under the control of the Soviet Government of Moscow were as ruthlessly centralized in 1920-3 as they had been under the Imperial Government of Petrograd down to 1917 ; and that any nationality which sought to exercise genuine self-government (e. g. the Georgians) was repressed by military force. All this may be admitted without detracting from the importance of the territorial changes on a longer view. Such changes are seldom reversed when they are in harmony with the spirit of the age, and the new political map of Russia might prove to be the one positive legacy of the Soviet régime, as the departments in France had been the enduring monument of the Revolution.

² The figure for 1921, excluding the 13,212,000 inhabitants of Burma.

³ The political development of India during this period was an internal affair of the British Commonwealth, which falls outside the scope of the present work. For the condition of China see the *Survey for 1920-3*, VI (iv) 4.

⁴ In 1920 the Catalans were still submerged by Spain, the Koreans by Japan, the Georgians by Soviet Russia, and the Armenians by Russia and Turkey ; the Ukrainians were divided (like the Jugoslavs in 1914) between three sovereignties (the Union of Soviet Republics, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) ; and the Kurds were divided between three other sovereignties (Turkey, Iraq, and Persia), although the consciousness of a common Kurdish

redeemed.¹ He could cite instances to prove that the Peace Conference had meted out one measure to the victors and another to the vanquished, and he might argue with some plausibility that the gains had been cancelled by the losses, and that the general effect of the settlement had been to reverse the positions of 'top-dog' and 'under-dog' without altering their relations or reforming their behaviour. No doubt there would have been a considerable element of truth in this contention. The possibilities of a just and generous settlement were evidently prejudiced by the immediate background of a bitter and exhausting war, and even more by the vista of domination and oppression which stretched back for centuries behind the War of 1914. The political atmosphere of Eastern Europe, in particular, could not be purified instantaneously by drawing fresh lines on a map. All parties alike had breathed it in for generations, and all would therefore continue to show the pathological effects of the contagion for some time to come. The first impulse of a nation just released from duress is to behave like the Unmerciful Servant towards its weaker neighbours and especially towards its former masters. Indeed, a nation suddenly enabled to indulge the instinct of domination after long repression will usually take greater advantage of its opportunities than a nation satiated by a long enjoyment of power. In the light of these commonplace psychological facts it appears remarkable, not that the Peace Conference was guilty of flagrant anomalies and injustices in dealing with particular national issues, but that it attempted to work on an abstract principle and that it was successful, on the whole, in putting this principle into practice.

The general principle of settlement was to base the new map upon nationality within the limits permitted by the co-ordinate factor of economic geography,² and it was this conditional element in the principle which facilitated the introduction of anomalies and injustices in practice. The principle, in fact, involved in every concrete case an empirical compromise between two primary forces

nationality was likely at no distant future to disengage itself from tribal particularism, as had recently happened in the case of the Albanians. (The boundary dispute between Turkey and Iraq in Kurdistan will be dealt with in the *Survey of International Affairs for 1925*.)

¹ e. g. the German minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Belgium (in the Eupen-Malmédy districts), Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia; the Jugoslavs in Italy; the Macedonian Bulgars in Yugoslavia; the Magyars in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

² This principle was lucidly expressed by the Council of the League on the 12th October, 1921, in their recommendation for the partition of Upper Silesia. (Text in *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 620-1.)

which were not only unrelated but contradictory—a decentralizing tendency towards national devolution and a unifying tendency towards economic co-operation.

At a number of points the settlement had arrived at the practical limits of territorial subdivision, and this fact made itself felt in the course of the next four years. Luxembourg, for instance, surrendered in 1921 the economic independence which she had recovered after the War by her secession from the German *Zollverein*,¹ and in 1923 the largely illiterate population of Carpatho-Ruthenia made its first experiment in local autonomy within the larger and stronger framework of Czechoslovakia. There were other minorities, identified with certain social classes or economic occupations, which possessed no territorial basis whatever and whose aspirations were therefore incapable of being satisfied in terms of local autonomy—even of the most restricted scope.² In the case of these scattered minorities the rigid application of the national principle as an exclusive basis of political association could only bring in diminishing returns. Such minorities could not be organized into separate territorial communities in their own homes, and if the principle of national uniformity on the territorial basis were to be pushed to extremes there were only three alternatives before them: either they must renounce their nationality and assume that of the surrounding majority; or they must leave their homes and emigrate to a country in which the majority of the population was of their nationality; or, if they were to escape the choice between emigration and denationalization, they must induce a neighbouring state of their own nationality to conquer and annex the territory in which they lived—a remedy which was worse than the disease, since it would safeguard the national existence of a minority by destroying the national independence of the surrounding alien majority and reducing it in turn to the position of a minority in some larger unit.

At the beginning of 1920 all these miserable alternatives were being forced upon minorities in different parts of the world;³

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, II (i) 2.

² e. g. the Germans in Poland, the Poles in White Russia and the Ukraine, the Muslims in the Balkan States, the Greeks and Armenians in Turkey, and the Jews almost everywhere. None of these minorities could be eliminated by extending even to infinity the process of territorial subdivision. On the other hand, the expedient of territorial autonomy within a larger state, which had been applied to Carpatho-Ruthenia, was a possible solution for the unsolved nationality problems of Rumania (e. g. for the Magyar and German enclaves in Transylvania), Yugoslavia, and the Iberian Peninsula.

³ e. g. Poland was assisting local Polish minorities to dominate non-Polish majorities in the western districts of White Russia and the Ukraine; Greece

and everywhere the process was destroying happiness, prosperity, and goodwill, and creating resentment and political unrest. This would have been a cumulative menace to the stability of the new political map, and therefore to the prospects of the League of Nations, if the statesmen of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at the Peace Conference had not devised the series of Treaties for the Protection of Minorities as a fourth alternative of a different order.¹ In 1920 the question whether the League of Nations would succeed in securing the *bona fide* execution of these treaties was of greater importance than the question when and to what extent the new frontiers would be changed.² A certain number of these frontiers, no doubt, would prove unstable, but territorial changes on the scale of those which had occurred during the past six years were hardly to be expected during the next half-century. The explosion of 1914 had been caused by the accumulated pressure of a hundred baulked and pent-up national aspirations. In the interval the majority of these had been either satisfied or shown to be visionary by the logic of events, and the *élan vital* of Nationalism was being diminished almost everywhere by satiety, disillusionment, or lassitude.

was giving similar support to Greek minorities against Turkish majorities in Western Anatolia; the Jews were emigrating in large numbers from many East European countries in order to escape repression; while the numerous minorities which were unable either to emigrate or to summon more powerful kinsmen to their aid were suffering forcible conversion, in various degrees, to the established nationality of the state under whose sovereignty they happened to find themselves.

¹ See the admirable account of their genesis in *H. P. C.*, vol. v, Ch. II, and the texts of four of the Treaties in the appendixes to the same volume. For the history of the execution and extension of these Treaties during the years 1920-3, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, III (i).

² Perhaps the most important concrete question involved in the effort to secure toleration for national minorities was the economic future of Germany. In 1914 the German nationality dominated large tracts of Eastern Europe through the agency of the Prussian and Austrian monarchies, and the consequent political hostility of the submerged nationalities closed many minds to German culture and many doors to German trade. In 1920 the tables were turned. The German political ascendancy had been broken; its restoration was not imminent; and the subject minorities were now Germans instead of being Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, or Jugoslavs. The political cause of the previous anti-German feeling in Eastern Europe, and with it the barrier to German economic progress, had thus been removed, and if the new national states could learn to tolerate the German minorities in their midst, they were likely to find them invaluable for building up their economic life. (The ancestors of the German minorities in Slovakia and Transylvania had been invited to settle there in the Middle Ages for the sake of their economic services.) From the economic point of view, Germany and Eastern Europe were at this time complementary, and since 1914 Germany's economic enterprise had been diverted from the overseas trade by the loss of her merchant marine and her African colonies.

If, however, the states of the world were to be sufficiently homogeneous to co-operate successfully in a League, there were further problems to be solved and differences to be adjusted. Nationality is merely a principle of dissociation and association, and the citizens of one national state may be differentiated from those of another by the political constitution under which they are governed. In this respect the constitutional requirements of the Covenant were not exacting. The 'full self-government' which was laid down as a condition for the admission of any state, dominion, or colony to membership in the League by the terms of Article 1, was interpreted in practice to mean 'full control of its own internal affairs and its own foreign relations' by the Government concerned, and not 'full control of the government by the people of the country'. States as diverse in their internal political conditions as the British Empire, China, France, and Japan were original Members of the League;¹ and in September 1923, when the Fourth Assembly was considering the application of Abyssinia, it inquired, not whether the internal constitution of Abyssinia was autocratic, parliamentary, or sovietic, but whether the actual *de jure* Government at Addis Abeba was in effective control of the territories recognized by treaty as falling under its sovereignty.² 'Self-government' in the sense of 'sovereign independence' could, after all, be pronounced to exist or not to exist in any given case by the application of external tests which would be accepted as conclusive by a general consensus of opinion, whereas any attempt to define 'self-government' in terms of 'government by the people' would have carried the question at once into the region of controversy.

The meaning of 'self-government' in this second sense was, in fact, being hotly debated between Western society and Bolshevik Russia. To the Western mind the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' was a more thorough despotism, both in theory and practice, than the autocracy of the Czar; and the Bolsheviks, on their part, denounced 'Democracy' and all its watchwords (freedom of association, freedom of the press, and freedom of elections) as devices for depriving the 'labouring masses' of self-government and for maintaining the political ascendancy of the *bourgeoisie*. This Russian challenge to the Western conception of 'self-government' drew attention to the

¹ It may still be doubted whether India, Cuba, Haiti, Liberia, and Panama were theoretically eligible for membership, even on the broadest interpretation of 'full self-government', in view of the control exercised over their foreign policy by Great Britain and the United States respectively.

² See the *Survey for 1920-3*, V (ii).

fact that an abstract formula had been invested by Western political thought with a precise and almost technical meaning. The West would have defined 'self-government', in the sense of 'government by the people', as parliamentary representative government on a democratic franchise. Almost all the Allied and Associated Powers except the Russian Empire had possessed constitutions of this type before the War of 1914; the Entente had inscribed 'Democracy' upon its banner to point a contrast between its own ideal of government and that of the Central Powers; and the revolutions which had broken out at the time of the Armistice in the defeated Central Empires had swept away the unparliamentary features by which their constitutions had previously been distinguished from those of France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European neutrals which had since joined the League, and the Members of the League overseas, were all governed, at least in theory, on the parliamentary representative system; and all over the world there had recently been wide extensions of the franchise (including, in some countries, the enfranchisement of women) and experiments in proportional representation. The machinery of Parliamentarism, thus improved, was expected to register more accurately than before the relative strength at each moment of the different currents of opinion in the body politic, and thus parliamentary representative government was to be vindicated as the effective and ultimate vehicle of the democratic idea.

The Parliamentarism of 1920, however, was not a spontaneous and self-evident product of the human faculty for political co-operation; it was a highly specialized system which had been evolved in England very gradually out of the rudimentary representative institutions of Western feudalism, and had then spread from England to other countries in comparatively recent times. The United States and the lesser English-speaking nations overseas had inherited the system in its original English form. Elsewhere it had been adopted in the modified form evolved in France, where English parliamentary institutions had been standardized and disengaged from idiosyncrasies peculiar to the English character. France herself, however, had not adopted the parliamentary system until the Revolution of 1789; in the rest of the European Continent and in Latin America it had gained no substantial footing until after the general war of 1792-1815; and although from that time onwards the combined prestige of France and Great Britain had enabled Parliamentarism, like Nationalism, to win its way, its progress had

been stubbornly contested by the *ancien régime*. It was not until 1871 that it obtained anything like universal recognition, and even then its victory was incomplete in Austria, the German Empire, Prussia, and certain other federal states of the *Reich*, and still more so in Hungary, Spain, Portugal, the Balkan states, and most of the Latin Republics in America. Had the parliamentary system taken firmer root in these new domains during the half-century between 1871 and 1920? Did its outward victory in the War of 1914 indicate that by this time it had become part and parcel of the political life of the world? The answer would almost certainly be in the affirmative if the strength of Parliamentarism were measured by its success in repelling the attacks of Bolshevism. Germany, for example, who had seemed ripe for Bolshevism in the last months of 1918, had emerged as a democratic state in the Western meaning of the term by the end of July, 1919, when the Constitution of Weimar had passed its third reading in the Assembly. Bolshevism had failed to capture her; and the dictatorships of the proletariat which were established at Munich and Budapest for a brief moment in 1919, only demonstrated, by their rapid overthrow and the violent reaction which they aroused, how deeply repugnant the Bolshevik system of government was to the spirit of Western society.¹ Thus, at the beginning of 1920, Parliamentarism was not seriously threatened by Bolshevism beyond the borders of Soviet Russia herself; yet at the same time it was being undermined from within by other and perhaps more powerful forces.

The first of these solvents was the world-wide extension of the Western economic system through the revolutionary modern improvements in transport and communication; for this economic change was depriving associations based on locality of their former social significance, whereas the system of parliamentary representation, like the consciousness of nationality (with which it had gone hand in hand), presupposed that the corporate sense in politics was a function of geographical neighbourhood. Between 1871 and 1914 the parliamentary system had been somewhat enfeebled, even in its home countries, by the emergence of new political forces incapable of representation on a local basis yet sufficiently powerful and important to demand, and receive, a voice in the government of the state. The task of modifying the parliamentary system in such a way as to provide these forces with legitimate representation

¹ For the history of the German Revolution in 1918-19 see *H. P. C.*, vol. i, Ch. II, and vol. ii, Ch. VII.

had hardly been taken in hand ; proportional representation did not offer a solution for this fundamental problem ; and there was an uneasy realization of a growing discrepancy between the official mechanism of government and the real play of forces behind the scenes. In fact, while parliamentary government in 1920 was possibly receiving greater lip-service than ever before, there was a noticeable diminution in its actual prestige in almost every country where it was officially established. This weakness would naturally be most pronounced in those countries (and they were the great majority) in which Parliamentarism was an exotic plant of recent growth ;¹ and in several such countries the apparently solid crust of political life was already threatened by volcanic movements which might be violently opposed to Bolshevism in their objectives, but which were ready to imitate the Bolshevik methods of organization and procedure. The *Fasci di Combattimento* which had sprung up in Italy during the War might be described as 'inverted' or *bourgeois* Soviets, for they, too, were constituted in contempt of the parliamentary system in order to establish the dictatorship of a minority by the 'direct action' of physical force.² Fascism was destined, during the next four years, to open the first breach in the constitutional homogeneity of the national states of Western Europe.³

¹ See Mr. G. M. Trevelyan's suggestive account of Fascism as a reversion to the 'row in the Piazza' which had been the political method of the medieval Italian city-states (*Historical Causes of the Present State of Affairs in Italy*).

² Compare the contemporary revival of the Ku-Klux-Klan movement in the United States (and this time not only in the South or only in opposition to the Negro).

³ On the 4th December, 1924, while this book was in the press, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, made a speech in London, in the Albert Hall, in which he discussed the prospects of democracy in the modern world. From the passage quoted below it will be seen that, while he accepted the current identification of democracy with parliamentary representative institutions, Mr. Baldwin was acutely conscious that these institutions were a local and precarious growth.

It is a testing-time for democracy. Many are those who would pay and do pay lip-service to it. But I remember that democracy is after all but the government of the people, by the people through their freely elected representatives, and unless the responsibility for that government is felt throughout the length and breadth of the country, from top to bottom, by men and women alike, democracy itself will fail.

Democracy, democratic government, calls for harder work, for higher education, for further vision than any form of government known in this world. It has not lasted long yet in the West, and it is only by those like ourselves who believe in it making it a success that we can hope to see it permanent and yielding those fruits which it ought to yield. The assertion of the people's rights has never yet provided that people with bread. The performance of their duties and that alone can lead to the successful issue of those experiments in government which we have carried further than any other people in this world.

2. THE CONTACT OF CIVILIZATIONS

The possibilities of homogeneity and heterogeneity in human society are not exhausted by the activities which find expression in state institutions. Individuals who in 1920 were loyal Englishmen, Italians, or Russians, or convinced Parliamentarians, Fascists, or Communists would also be children of Western or Byzantine civilization and workers in the town or in the country. There were certain fundamental distinctions of culture and occupation which were on too broad a scale to be embodied in particular states, like the distinctions of nationality and of political creed, but which nevertheless divided Mankind into separate camps ; and these relations, though not ' interstate ' or even technically ' international ', were of great moment for the future of the world.

In 1914 the Gospel of Western civilization was being preached in all lands. No society had expanded with such an impetus since Alexander the Great and his successors had spread the leaven of Hellenism through the ancient societies of the Middle East and India, and modern *Homo Occidentalis*, intoxicated with his triumphal march, had come to regard the earth as his exclusive heritage. This anticipation was premature. The other competitors had been pushed into the background, but not driven off the field ; and while in 1914 the Westerner, from his commanding position, might be tempted to ignore their existence, in 1920 he was aware that they were more than maintaining their ground, and was even suffering some discomfort from their pressure.

In 1920 several of these surviving non-Western societies—enmeshed in the Western system but not yet domesticated or assimilated—were struggling to break away, and their convulsions threatened serious damage to the delicate filaments in which they were entangled. The West had flung the network of her economic relationships round the world ; she had propagated her political doctrines of Nationalism and Parliamentarism, and her statesmen were attempting to incorporate all contemporary states, of every lineage, in a single league of fully self-governing nations. At this stage the framework of world society was bound, for good or evil, to be of Western workmanship if a world society was to be achieved at all—and that was no longer an open question from the Western point of view. By extending her economic activities all over the world, the West had bound up her material interests irrevocably with an organization of society on a world-wide scale, and any serious

derangement of the new world unit of economic life—either by the violent secession of its non-Western constituents, or even by a pronounced change in the existing balance of economic power and function—might bring disaster upon the millions of industrial workers in the congested heart of Western civilization. If Mankind was to be saved from an even greater disaster than the War of 1914, it was essential to establish some *modus vivendi* between Western civilization and the four alien societies which the West had invaded: the Byzantine world (in the Balkan Peninsula and Russia), the Islamic world, the Hindu world, and the Far Eastern world.¹ The great economic revolution which had transformed the conditions of life in the West itself had inflicted a more formidable shock upon these other societies. It had fallen upon them with the sudden impact of an external force, and it had opened a breach for the influx into their midst of Western scientific, political, and moral ideas. The revolution which had been confined, in its Western focus, to the economic surface of life, had shaken the non-Western societies to the depths of their being, and in 1920 they were all reacting violently to this powerful stimulus in different directions.

The peoples of Byzantine culture in the Balkan Peninsula had definitely made up their minds by this time to merge themselves, without any reservations, in Western society.² On the new political map, this act of union was symbolized by the obliteration of the old eastern frontier of the Hapsburg Monarchy, to make way for Yugoslavia and Greater Rumania. That frontier, along which the continuous friction of incompatible policies had kindled sudden war in 1914, had been more than a line of demarcation between one state and another; it had also divided the realms of rival alphabets, churches, and cultures;³ and the first shots fired across the Save and the Danube in July, 1914, while they had portended the political triumph of Serbia and the doom of Austria-Hungary, had also announced the annexation of the Balkan Peninsula to the domain of Western civilization. Six years later the *débris* of Austria-

¹ These four societies included all civilized or semi-civilized non-Western communities existing in 1920, except the Hinayana Buddhist peoples of Siam, Burma, and Ceylon, and the Mahayana Buddhists of Tibet and Mongolia, who were peripheral survivals of two particular phases of ancient Indian civilization and could not be classified as members of modern Hindu or modern Far Eastern society.

² Until the latter part of the seventeenth century these peoples had held aloof from the West almost as decidedly as the Hindus or the Muslims.

³ Bosnia-Herzegovina was the only sector in which the political frontier of 1914 had not coincided approximately with the cultural frontier. Hence Bosnia-Herzegovina had been the focus of the conflagration.

Hungary choked and bridged a gulf which had divided the children of Byzantium from the children of the West for a thousand years ; and in Yugoslavia and Greater Rumania populations drawn from the two societies were finding fields for amalgamation on the common ground of linguistic nationality.¹

The very opposite process was at work in Byzantine Russia, who, instead of consummating her union with the West, was turning her back, at the moment, upon Western civilization.² This divorce was symbolized, likewise, upon the new political map by the severance from Russia of the immense zone of alien provinces—extending from Finland through Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to Poland—which had linked her geographically to the Western world and had furnished recruits of Western origin and culture to leaven her officialdom and her *intelligentsia*. At the moment when the Byzantine and Western cultures were being newly amalgamated in Yugoslavia and Rumania, their older union in the Russian Empire was being dissolved. In 1920 the work of Peter the Great and his successors was almost undone. Reval and Riga had ceased to be Russian ports, and the Russian coastline on the Baltic was as narrow as it had been in 1703, when the Russian apostle of Westernization had founded St. Petersburg. Through such a ‘leper’s squint’ a great society could hardly communicate with its peers, and in 1920 Russia had abandoned the endeavour. Her Marxist Government had evacuated the depopulated capital of the Westernized Czardom and had retreated to the Kremlin of Byzantine Moscow.

Karl Marx would have been astonished to learn that the first socialist state in the world would be established on Russian soil,

¹ Yugoslavia and Greater Rumania were the two principal experiments in the synthetic production of new nations out of elements drawn from different cultures, and it was this which made their internal difficulties particularly interesting to the outside world in 1920. A similar combination of Western and Byzantine elements was noticeable in several other states of the East European group. Byzantine Greece was linked with the West through the Greek colonies in the commercial centres of Western Europe and America, who had intermixed with their Western neighbours. Poland contained Byzantine elements in her White Russian and Ukrainian subjects belonging to the Orthodox and Uniate Churches ; and the Uniate Ukrainians of Carpatho-Ruthenia gave a touch of Byzantinism to Czechoslovakia.

² The contrast between the tendencies in Russia and among the Balkan peoples in 1920 was the more remarkable inasmuch as Russia had entered into the life of the West during the previous two and a half centuries to a much greater extent than her lesser co-religionists. Since 1772–4 the Russian Empire had been a Great Power in the Western political system, while since 1815 Russian thought and imagination had exercised a growing influence upon the Western mind. There had been no intercourse comparable to this between the West and the Balkan peoples during the same period.

and still more astonished if he could have foreseen the direction in which Russian Marxism was destined to travel. Why should a political doctrine which presupposed the industrial conditions of society characteristic of the West win its first official victory in the least industrialized country in Europe? And why, again, should this victory of a specifically Western idea be accompanied, in Russia, not by a further advance along the path of Westernization, but by almost complete withdrawal from contact with Western society?

The explanation was that in Russia the Marxian 'class war' disguised a conflict of a different character. The struggle in Russia since 1917 had been waged not so much between the two Western forces of Capital and Labour as between Russia herself and Western civilization. The '*bourgeois* society' of Russia had succumbed to the Red Revolution because it was a Western veneer, with none of that solidity which the *bourgeoisie* possessed in the Western countries where it was at home. The bureaucracy of Russia had collapsed because it had never succeeded in attaining the standards of the French and German bureaucracy on which it had been modelled. The liberal *intelligentsia* had been crushed because they had been too few and too inexperienced to take political control after the first Revolution, and not too numerous to be exterminated, after the second, by expulsion, starvation, and massacre. In short, a Western revolutionary movement had triumphed in Russia largely because in Russia the Western system of society was a house built upon the sands;¹ and, in thus triumphing, revolutionary Marxism had defeated its own ends. In attempting to uproot 'capitalism' from Russia, it had, at least temporarily, eliminated Western civilization itself, and had thus demolished the foundations necessary for any Western structure, *bourgeois* or socialist.

Historical forces, stronger than the will of dictators, were compelling Lenin and Trotsky to execute, in the name of Marx, the policy which the Slavophiles had vainly demanded of Nicholas I.

¹ It was for a similar reason that the Western idea of nationality had triumphed in Balkan countries like Greece and Serbia, where it was exotic, nearly half a century before it succeeded in asserting itself in Italy and Germany. In 1821 the Italian and German national movements were in themselves very much more powerful forces than the nationalism of the Serbs and Greeks, but their victory was delayed because the obstacles which they had to overcome were disproportionately stronger. The Greeks and Serbs would never have prevailed if they had had to deal at that time with the Hapsburg Monarchy, while the national unification of Italy and Germany would hardly have been delayed for a day if it had been opposed by a Power as feeble as the Ottoman Empire.

While the Bolsheviks were ostensibly imposing an exotic Western doctrine upon Russia by a *tour de force*, Russia herself was subtly employing her new masters as instruments in a reaction against all the works of Western civilization.¹ Russia in 1920 was apparently doing in her own roundabout way what Japan had done systematically and deliberately in the seventeenth century : she was breaking her links with the Western world.² When the operation was over, she might possibly choose, like Japan at that earlier date, to maintain a certain number of economic relations under jealous official control and on the strictest terms of aloofness and independence, but she showed as yet no tendency to swing back into the Western orbit. In 1920 she was steering an eastward course, and the Middle East, India, and China were beginning to feel the influence of her field of gravitation.

The success of Soviet Russia in recovering the Asiatic frontiers of the Czardom was as striking as her loss of ground in Europe. When the last 'White' armies were dispersed, the 'Red' troops, following at their heels, re-entered Baku and Tiflis, Tashkend and Merv, Irkutsk and Vladivostock.³ Before the end of 1920 the *de facto* sovereigns of All the Russias were in possession of the several strategic railways which their predecessors had carried up to the back doors of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan ;⁴

¹ How far were the Bolshevik leaders conscious of this ? Some sense of the direction in which they were really travelling is indicated by the curious detail that they modelled their new official costumes upon those of the Russian heroic age in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after Christ. In 1920 Soviet Komisars were masquerading in helmets of the style affected by the medieval princes of Kiev and Vladimir !

² Just before going to press my attention was drawn to an article in *Die Neue Rundschau* (5 Heft, Mai 1924, G. Fischer Verlag A.-G., Berlin) by Werner Bergengruen, entitled 'Die Russischen Kommunisten und der b uerliche Mythos'. In this article, which was published a month or two after I had written the above pages, similar ideas in regard to developments in Russia since 1917 are presented in greater detail and with more knowledge of the subject than I possess.—A. J. T.

³ The only territories in Asia which they did not recover were : (i) the Transcaucasian districts of Kars and Ardahan, acquired from Turkey in 1878, which were retroceded to Turkey under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and then again, definitively, by the Treaty negotiated at Moscow, in March, 1921, between the Soviet Republic and the Great National Assembly of Angora ; (ii) the former Russian zone in Persia evacuated in 1917. (In a letter addressed to the Persian Government at the time of the signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August, 1919, the British Government also had implicitly abandoned the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.) For the policy and progress of Soviet Russia in the Middle East and the Far East respectively see the *Survey for 1920-3*, IV (iii) and VI (i) and (ii).

⁴ The only ex-Russian line which did not at this time fall into the Soviet Government's hands was the Chinese Eastern Railway, which provided the shortest line of communication between Vladivostock and the rest of Russia,

and their anti-Western policy might enable them to unlock gates which the Czardom could only have battered down by force. While the 'Third International' at Moscow were still preaching the orthodox Marxian 'class war' to the proletariat of Eastern and Central Europe, the Bolshevik propaganda in Asia was inciting all the surviving non-Western societies to co-operate with Russia in a war against Western ascendancy.¹ The object of the new Russian diplomacy in this quarter was to reverse the roles of Russia and Great Britain. During the century which had ended in 1917, Russia had been regarded as the arch-aggressor by the Muslim world and Japan, and the odium which she had inspired had made her a most effective foil to the British Empire. The sympathy which Great Britain had acquired in Turkey and Persia by her traditional opposition to Russia's aims had even survived the Anglo-Russian *Entente* of 1907, for Great Britain was still believed to exercise a restraining influence upon the imperialism of her former rival. In 1917, however, Russian imperialism had appeared to change by magic into a liberalism which altogether eclipsed the merits of Great Britain. The first Revolution had renounced annexations, and words had been followed by deeds when the Bolsheviks evacuated Persia and restored Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. Meanwhile, Great Britain had remained in military occupation of extensive Ottoman and Persian territories; after the Armistice she had also occupied Constantinople² and the lines of the Transcaucasian and Transcaspian Railways; since the beginning of the Peace Conference she had advocated the break-up of the Ottoman Empire; and she had taken the lead in supporting the Greek invasion of Anatolia. This policy had already produced violent manifestations of anti-British feeling in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and India. Might not Russia adopt the traditional tactics of her adversary and skilfully cast the discarded mantle of the Czar round the shoulders of England? There was blood upon it enough to make it as deadly as the shirt of Nessus.³ If the poison worked, Soviet Russia might

though it ran through the Chinese territory of Manchuria. In 1920 this railway was still being administered by the former 'White' Russian Company (in which there was a large French holding) with Japanese support. (See *Survey of International Affairs for 1924*.)

¹ This propaganda had been anticipated by the 'Pan-Islamism' of 'Abdu'l-Hamid and the 'Pan-Asiaticism' of a certain school of publicists in Japan.

² Although Constantinople was occupied jointly by the Principal Allied Powers, the British naval and military contingents overshadowed the others.

³ A good illustration of the propaganda to which the British Empire was at this time exposed is afforded by the history of a photograph showing Persian notables being hanged at Tabriz in 1909 by Russian soldiers. Before

hope to snatch a greater Asiatic empire out of defeat and renunciation than the Czars had ever gained by naked aggression,¹ and to manœuvre Great Britain into the paths of destruction which hitherto she had avoided. These were the Asiatic objectives of Bolshevik propaganda in 1920, when the defeat of the 'Whites' enabled the Soviet Government to assume the offensive against unfriendly foreign Powers. The nineteen million Muslims of the former Russian Empire, almost all of whom had passed under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union, formed a valuable link between Moscow and the Islamic world. Some of these Russian Muslims had become Communists—either from personal opportunism or from true Marxian conviction or because they believed that Soviet Russia was the most promising leader for an anti-Western movement among the Asiatic peoples, whether or not they accepted the Marxian creed. There were Muslim majorities in six² out of the nine autonomous republics and five³ out of the twelve autonomous regions of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, and in one⁴ of the three states of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet Republic, as established under the Constitution of 1923. Many of these Muslim communities might only enjoy self-government on paper, and sporadic revolts in Turkestan or among the Caucasian mountaineers indicated that some of them felt the Bolshevik régime to be as oppressive as the centralized autocracy of the Czar; but most of these disaffected areas were remote from the centres of the Islamic world; little news of what was happening in the interior of Soviet Russia trickled through;⁵ and, even if the Muslim peoples beyond the

1917 this photograph had been circulated in the East as anti-Russian propaganda with a 'caption' giving a correct account of the scene which it represented. By 1918 the photograph had been transformed into anti-British propaganda by the simple substitution of the 'caption': 'British soldiers hanging Persians'!

¹ Historical precedents indicated that this was a serious possibility. Revolutionary France had risen from the ashes of the *ancien régime* to achieve more than the territorial ambitions of Louis XIV, and Great Britain had learnt, from her rivals' mistakes and her own, how to build up, in half a century, an empire greater and more durable than that which she had lost in 1783.

² The Bashkir, Tatar, Kirghiz, Daghestan, Gorski, and Turkestan Republics. (The Muslims also constituted 26 per cent. of the population in the Crimean Republic.)

³ The Chuvash, Kabarda, Karachaevo-Cherkess, Adigeevsko-Cherkess, and Chechensk regions.

⁴ The Republic of Azerbaijan, with the Nakhchevan district. The Transcaucasian Republic of Georgia also included the Muslim autonomous republic of Ajaria.

⁵ There was a certain amount of intercourse between the Russian protectorate of Bokhara and the independent Muslim state of Afghanistan, which

frontier suspected that the improvement in the position of their Russian co-religionists was not so great as the Bolshevik propaganda proclaimed it to be, few of them could afford, in 1920, to refuse the diplomatic, financial, and military support which Moscow held out to them.

In 1914 the fortunes of Islam had been at a lower ebb than at any time for the past six centuries.¹ The Islamic community was indisputably intended by its founder to be a kingdom of this world and not only of the world to come, yet in 1914 no completely independent Muslim state was left upon the map. The sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire was at that time restricted by a network of international servitudes, while every other Muslim community, whatever its theoretical status, had fallen under the direct or indirect political control of some particular non-Muslim Power. It was true that Islam possessed a certain latent strength in the sense of brotherhood with which its members were imbued more deeply than the various sects of contemporary Christendom.² This corporate feeling, inherited from a greater past, had been heightened for about a quarter of a century by a common consciousness of the external pressure to which almost every Muslim people was being subjected at that time by the expansion of the West. The Ottoman Sultan 'Abdu'l-Hamid (1876-1909) had attempted to conduct this vague but growing movement of 'Pan-Islamism' into a definite channel by emphasizing the claim of his dynasty to the Caliphate or temporal leadership of the entire Islamic world. The extension

marched with one another along the upper course of the Oxus. Under the old régime, Bokhara and Khiva had been nominally independent Khanates in perpetual alliance with Russia (with a status not unlike that of the Native States in British India). During 1920, the Soviet Government of Moscow set up Soviet Republics in Khiva and Bokhara, and bound both states to itself by treaties of the old pattern, but the Russian military cordon along the frontier between Bokhara and Afghanistan does not appear to have been re-established until 1923.

¹ The greatest previous crisis in the history of Islam had been the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century after Christ. The Mongol conquerors were pagans with Nestorian Christian and Buddhist proclivities, and for the first two generations they showed a marked hostility to Islam. Between the sack of Baghdad in A. D. 1258 and the conversion of the three Western Mongol hordes during the first half of the fourteenth century, the greater part of Islamic society was reduced to the condition of an oppressed and often persecuted sect.

² The Islamic community was six centuries younger than the Christian Church and, as a social institution, it displayed in 1914 many points of similarity to Christian society at an earlier stage of development. The corporate feeling of the Sunni community down to 1914 was comparable to that of the Latin Church down to the first years of the fourteenth century.

of the Western economic system had provided the material means for establishing contact between the scattered members of the Islamic brotherhood (through the telegraph, the railway, the steamship, and the press) at the very time when the territorial aggrandizement of the Western Powers was creating the incentive for concerted defensive action; and, after 1908, when 'Abdu'l-Hamid had been deposed by the Party of Union and Progress, the new rulers of the Ottoman Empire had attempted to carry on the Hamidian policy of Pan-Islamism through the agency of a Sultan-Caliph amenable to their control. This Ottoman propaganda, however, had proved ineffective when put to the test in October, 1914. The proclamation at Constantinople in the Caliph's name of the *Jihad* or Holy War against the Entente Powers had neither precipitated revolts in Egypt and India against the British Empire¹ nor deterred the Sherif of Mecca from leading a national revolt of the Ottoman Arabs and depriving the Sultan-Caliph of his sovereignty over the Holy Cities of the Hijaz. In January, 1920, the Caliph was the prisoner (or, as some of his own subjects were already murmuring, the tool) of the victorious Allied Powers, who were in military occupation of his capital; the Hamidian Pan-Islamic movement had broken down; and the different sections of the Islamic world, cut off from communication with one another by six years of war, were beginning to react to the importunate Western Question in contrary directions.

At this moment the comparatively compact and homogeneous Muslim peoples of the Middle East were entering upon the course which their Christian neighbours in the Balkan Peninsula were completing.² They were turning their backs upon their own past and setting out to find salvation in the Western principles of linguistic nationality, parliamentary government, and the separation of Church and State. This ambitious programme, which involved a radical change in mental outlook and social institutions in addition to a drastic political revolution, was all implicit in the six brief

¹ The first serious disturbances in Egypt and Afghanistan occurred *after* the Armistice of October, 1918, and were expressions of national and not of Pan-Islamic feeling.

² There is some evidence that they were directly influenced by their example. Since 1908 a leading part had been taken in Turkish politics by the Macedonian Muslims, who had watched the rise of Greek, Bulgar, and Serb nationalism at close quarters and had been impressed with the power of the national idea by the victory of the Balkan States in the War of 1912-13, which had reduced the Macedonian Muslims from the position of a dominant race to that of a subject or expatriated minority. Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself was a Macedonian by birth.

clauses of the Turkish National Pact,¹ which was signed on the 28th January, 1920, by the members of the Ottoman Parliament then assembled at Constantinople. In this 'Westernizing' movement, which rapidly gathered momentum during the next four years throughout the Middle East, the Turkish Nationalists took the lead, because they were masters of their own 'homeland' in Anatolia and were therefore able, behind their military front, to carry through the revolution without foreign interference; but in Egypt and Syria, which were as closely in contact with the West as Turkey, the current was equally strong, though it had to contend with more powerful political obstacles; and it was also gathering force in Iraq, Persia, and Afghanistan, where the bold and dramatic gestures of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters were making a deep impression.²

One result of this was a rather paradoxical three-cornered relationship between the Soviet Government, the Western Powers, and the Middle Eastern Muslim peoples. The movement towards Westernization, on its political side, was bringing its adherents into immediate conflict with particular Western Governments, and in these struggles the Nationalists of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan all began to receive support from Moscow as soon as the intervening armies of General Denikin had been swept away. At the same time, this co-operation against a common enemy was a mere *alliance de convenance* which could not permanently reconcile a fundamental difference of aim. From 1920 onwards the Middle Eastern Muslims were struggling not to throw off the influence of the West but to force an entrance into Western society on terms of 'the most favoured nation', and the gulf between this policy and the anti-Western orientation of the Soviet Government was as great, of its kind, as that which had originally divided the Islamic and the Byzantine worlds before the Western factor had been introduced into their relations.

Meanwhile, the Indian Muslims were travelling in the contrary direction to their Middle Eastern co-religionists. The Western principle of nationality, to which the Middle Eastern peoples had

¹ Text in *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 605-6.

² Their geographical position had made Iraq, Persia, and Afghanistan less accessible to Western influence than the Middle Eastern countries with a Mediterranean seaboard, and the difference of religious denomination had hindered the Persians from receiving that influence indirectly through Ottoman channels. On the common basis of Nationalism and Laicism, however, these religious barriers were beginning, in 1920, to be transcended in the Middle East as they were in Eastern Europe.

committed themselves, offered poor prospects to a Muslim community which was everywhere scattered as a minority among the vastly greater mass of the Hindus.¹ In India, Nationalism, if carried to its logical conclusion, meant the supremacy of the Hindu over the Muslim element in the population, and therefore the Indian Muslims could give it only a qualified allegiance. If they were to co-operate at all with the Hindu Nationalists, they must safeguard their position by securing some external support in order to redress the Indian balance in their favour, and before the War of 1914 they had sought this support in the British *Raj*. Compared to the real presence of the impartial British administration, the distant Hamidian Caliphate had been a nebulous and ineffective force, and (except for a very few extremists) the Indian Muslims had not hesitated in making the choice which was forced upon them in October, 1914, by the intervention of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers. They had followed the Government under which they lived, and Indian Muslim troops had fought for that Government against Ottoman troops in 'Iraq and Palestine ;² but, as the War continued, there had been a pronounced change in the trend of Indian Muslim policy. Influenced by the current of reaction against Western civilization which was making itself felt in Russia and among the Hindus, the Indian Muslims had begun to co-operate more closely than before with the anti-British movement in Hindu politics, and, since they could not dispense with some external support,³ they began to look for it in an organized development of the Pan-Islamic idea as an alternative to the British connexion. At the beginning of 1920, when the Ottoman Caliphate at Constantinople was at the point of expiring under the cumulative effect of a succession of blows—the refusal of the Indian Muslims them-

¹ In the aggregate, of course, the Indian Muslims were more numerous than all the Middle Eastern peoples added together.

² The Muslim troops in the Russian Army had fought with equal loyalty, but these were only drawn from the scattered and partly Russianized Muslim enclaves in the central provinces of the Empire (e. g. Kazan). The compact Muslim populations in the General Government of Turkestan and in the Viceroyalty of the Caucasus had been exempted from conscription by the wise liberality of the Czar's Government. An attempt which was made during 1916 to recruit the Muslims of Russian Central Asia for non-combatant service behind the front had disastrous consequences.

³ The more closely the Indian Muslims allied themselves with the Hindus, the greater became their psychological need for a counterbalancing sense of solidarity with some non-Hindu Power. The Indian Caliphate movement was the necessary psychological complement to Muslim-Hindu co-operation on the platform of *Swaraj*, and this fact was recognized by the Hindu Nationalist politicians who gave the Caliphate movement their blessing.

selves to respond to the *Jihad*, the national revolt of the Arabs, the Allied occupation of the capital, and the new Turkish national movement, which was partly directed against the Sultan-Caliph as the supposed tool of the Allied Powers—a Khilafat Committee in India was formulating a series of claims on behalf of the Ottoman Caliphate which were grounded in the precepts of Islamic theology and presented a sharp contrast to the Western postulates of the Turkish National Pact.¹

The Turkish Nationalists were concerned to maintain the integrity of their national territory and to establish their national independence and self-government within their own borders; they had renounced the ambition to rule over other Muslim nations and had determined to spend no more of their limited strength in fighting the battles of Islam. The Indian Muslims, on the other hand were concerned to maintain the unity of Islam and the temporal sovereignty of the Caliph. They thought of the Turks as instruments to these ends, and they subordinated Turkish national aspirations to their own conception of the Caliphate, whereas the Turks only cared for the Caliphate in so far as it served their own national interests and were even prepared to abolish it if its traditional prerogatives proved incompatible with the sovereignty of the Great National Assembly. Considering the contrast between these two points of view, it is hardly surprising to find that the Turkish National Pact and the Indian Khilafat Committee's declarations of the same date were in formal contradiction. The Turks demanded 'a more modernized and regular administration'; the Indian Muslims laid it down that 'temporal power is of the very essence of the institution of the Khilafat, and [that] Mussulmans can never agree to any change in its character'. The Turks recognized the independence of the Arabs *de facto* and *de jure*; the Indian Muslims stigmatized the Arab national movement as a 'clear defiance of the laws of Islam' and insisted that the sovereignty of the Caliph should be restored throughout the *Jaziratu'l-'Arab* and especially over the Holy Places, which the Turks passed over without a word. Here were plentiful seeds of misunderstanding, though there was to be no open breach until 1923. In the eyes of a Turkish or Egyptian Nationalist or of a Western observer, the Indian Khilafat Committee might seem an anachronism; yet its academic formulae were an

¹ See *The Address Presented by the Indian Khilafat Deputation to the Viceroy at Delhi on January 19th, 1920*, and *The Manifesto of the All-India Khilafat Conference passed at its Bombay Session, held on February 15th, 16th, and 17th, 1920* (Indian Khilafat Delegation Publications, No. 1).

attempt to satisfy a genuine and permanent political need of the Indian Muslim community. They were an expression of that craving for solidarity with some wider group which is felt by every minority, and thus the schism between the Muslim nations of the Middle East and the Muslims 'dispersed abroad among the Gentiles'—not only in India but in China, Russia, and the Balkan Peninsula—was something more than a temporary estrangement between progressives and reactionaries. A fundamental difference in their geographical situation was compelling these two divisions of the Islamic world to react towards the pressure of the West in different ways.

In 1920 Islam was rapidly acquiring a third domain, of great potential importance, in Tropical Africa. Here, again, the expansion of the Western economic system had assisted the propagation of Islam among the heathen through the private enterprise of Arab, or half-Arab, trader-missionaries, just as it had favoured the Pan-Islamic propaganda of 'Abdu'l-Hamid among the civilized Muslim peoples in Asia. The 'opening-up of Africa' by Western empire-builders had not only cleared a physical path for the preaching of Islam; it had created the psychological conditions for the mass conversion of native African society. The frail institutions of the native tribes had been effaced, almost automatically, by the ponderous action of the oncoming Western machine. The isolated village communities had been fused together politically into vast 'protectorates', and in certain areas¹ the young men and women were being drawn away from their homes by the rising cost of living, or by taxation deliberately imposed, in order to work on the White Men's plantations in a strange environment, where they mingled with the flotsam and jetsam of other tribes. Helpless and abashed in the face of this incomprehensible but overwhelming economic power which had suddenly taken possession of his material life, the African had discovered in Islam a cloak for his spiritual nakedness. Islam appealed to him because it was simple, fraternal, and non-Western. It was accessible to his understanding; it offered him membership in a world-wide society, with a great past and the promise of a greater future, in place of his tiny dissolving tribe; and it inspired him as a 'true believer' with a new self-respect and self-assurance in his dealings with the Western 'infidel', which tempered the

¹ This process was characteristic of East Africa and the Congo Basin, but not of the Guinea Coast or the Sudan. For its results in South-West Africa see the *Survey for 1920-3*, V (iv).

crushing sense of inferiority under which he had laboured in his 'days of ignorance'. Islam, moreover, succeeded, where Western Christianity failed, in overcoming the barriers of colour and climate. The missionaries of Islam were settling down among their African converts and intermarrying with them, whereas the missionaries of Western civilization (whether they were administrators, traders, planters, doctors, or missionaries in the technical sense) were holding aloof from the natives and were passing across the face of Africa like pilgrims and sojourners, to return after a few years to the distant European countries from which they came. In 1920 the time was no longer far distant when Tropical Africa, from the Sahara to the Zambesi, would constitute one vast dominion of Islam in which a few Christian enclaves like Abyssinia, Uganda, or Liberia would hardly interrupt the uniformity of creed; and this triumph of a non-Western religion was something more substantial than the triumphs of Western economic and political expansion which had rendered it possible. The Western map of Africa—maintained in 1920 by a few thousand exiles in an utterly alien environment—might conceivably pass in the night. The Islamic map of Africa would almost certainly remain, while the fertility of the Black Race would extend the range of the colour problem beyond the Tropical Zone. South of the Zambesi, in Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, a dominant White population was already outnumbered by the Blacks in the proportion of more than four to one; and, in the opposite quarter, the military organization of the French Empire was carrying the colour problem beyond the Sahara and the Mediterranean into the heart of Europe, where Senegalese conscripts were in military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.

The ferment which was at work in Tropical Africa and Islam and Russia was not less apparent in the Far Eastern and the Hindu worlds. In the Far East the Westernization of Japan could no longer be regarded as an exceptional phenomenon with no bearing upon the destinies of Far Eastern society as a whole.¹ In 1920 the imperialism of Japan was fast arousing a national consciousness in Korea and China; but in China, at any rate, the ferment was penetrating deep below the political surface. The political chaos

¹ Until 1914 it had seemed possible to account for the rise and progress of the movement in Japan by a special conjunction of favourable circumstances: an insular situation, a homogeneous population, a tradition of patriotism and militarism, and an inherited fund of technical skill which could be adapted to the Western industrial system.

into which the Chinese state had fallen since the overthrow of the Imperial Government in 1911 was diverting the attention of many outside observers from the still more violent travail of the Chinese mind. In 1920 the patriarchal system of Chinese family life, which had been ancient when Confucius had codified it twenty-four centuries earlier, was beginning to crack and crumble under the dissolving influence of Western ideas.¹ In Hindu society, again, the political agitation for self-government obscured the fundamental issue, which was not the political conflict between Hindu Swarajists and British officials, but the difference of orientation towards the West which divided the Hindus themselves. There were Swarajists with the same outlook as the Nationalists of Turkey, Egypt, or Japan, who objected to the British *Raj*, not because it was Western, but because it did not sufficiently satisfy the Western ideal of responsible government on a parliamentary basis. Such Swarajists aspired to supersede the British administration in order to carry on and complete its work, and while they differed with the British Government over questions of method and pace, they were working (for better or worse) towards the same ultimate goal. In the opposing camp were those Swarajists who desired to put an end to the British administration only as a first step towards the elimination of Western influence in every sphere. In the mind of this anti-Western party, *Swaraj* meant the withdrawal of Hindu society from all contact with the Western world; and Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of this school of thought, had come to the conclusion that the network of economic relationships, through which the West had interwoven the life of India with its own, was the most formidable bond which had to be broken if his ideal was to be attained. His programme was 'non-resistance' in the political field and the achievement of economic independence by the reintroduction of the spinning-wheel and the handloom into every Indian home.

(3) THE ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

In Mahatma Gandhi's policy the problem of the spiritual contact between civilizations passed over into the problem of equilibrium between the three economic groups into which the expansion of the Western system had temporarily divided Mankind. The great economic change initiated in the modern West had been named

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, VI (iv) 4.

'The Industrial Revolution', and in 1914 the new mechanical method of manufacture was certainly the dominant feature in the economic field. Among the vast and varied economic activities of the world, Industrialism was taking the lead. It was directing the production of food-stuffs and raw materials along the channels most to its advantage, and it was appropriating the lion's share of the common profits. While the Capital and Labour of the urban West were represented in the philosophy of Marx as the sole parties to the struggle for existence, which consisted, according to Marx, in a duel between these two antagonists, they were really co-operating all the time in the 'exploitation' of two other groups. One of these groups consisted of the residual agricultural population in the homelands of Industrialism, the sparsely settled agriculturists in the temperate countries colonized by Westerners overseas, and the cultivators of the Black-Earth Zone in Rumania, the Ukraine, and Western Siberia, all of whom were engaged in producing the food supply of the industrial centres. The other group consisted of the congested populations in certain civilized tropical or sub-tropical regions like India and the Far East, which were also agricultural but which could barely supply their own needs, even in normal years, and were subject to famine whenever there was a failure of the monsoon.¹ The deeper economic opposition between the Industrialists, without distinction of Capital and Labour, and these two non-industrial groups was receiving little attention in 1914 because it had not yet found expression in a 'class war' like that which had divided the ranks of the industrial community. At that time the non-industrial groups were compelled, for different reasons, to deal with industrialism on its own terms, with little power to bargain. The farmers of Western Europe, so far from being able to raise their real prices in proportion to the increasing demand of the local market created by the growing urban population, were compelled to reduce them by the competition of the new food-producing countries in the Black-Earth Zone and overseas, where cereals and live stock were being raised on a vast scale and exported at a low cost to the industrial centres by the mechanical processes which Industrialism had invented. On the other hand the agriculturists of the temperate zone overseas needed the reapers and binders, the railways and the steamships manufactured by the industrialists, if they were to raise and market their crops. They did not yet

¹ Tropical Africa and Tropical America did not fall into this category because they were both still sparsely populated.

possess sufficient man-power or money-power to supply their own industrial needs. As for the tropical group, their economic life seemed to have been adapted providentially to producing the greatest possible advantage for their industrial masters. They supplied them with the tropical raw materials which they required for their factories and at the same time offered them a market for their manufactured products. Although their purchasing power, as individuals, was very low, their numbers were so great that their market, in the aggregate, was lucrative and steady; and although they possessed, in their cheap labour and home-grown raw materials, potential advantages for the development of industries which might eventually make them irresistible competitors of the older industrial peoples, they had hardly yet begun to enter the industrial field.

Thus the balance of economic power, on which the supremacy of the industrialists depended in 1914, had been a complicated and delicate adjustment of forces. Had it also been precarious all the time, in spite of its apparent stability? In 1920 one school of political economists held that the equilibrium had already been showing signs of unsteadiness at the moment when it had been overturned by the shock of the War, while another school maintained that the economic effect of the War was to be regarded as an exceptional calamity which might or might not be transient, but which was certainly not implicit in any tendencies which had declared themselves in the pre-war period.¹ Whichever party might be right or wrong in this highly technical controversy, the relation of the three great groups *post bellum*, if not *propter bellum*, had sensibly altered to the industrialists' disadvantage.

In 1920 the food-producing countryside was asserting itself economically against the industrial cities, both in Europe and overseas. In Russia, Austria, Hungary, and eventually even in Germany, as the currency depreciated, the peasants were beginning to boycott the towns.² In Soviet Russia, and even in Poland and Rumania,

¹ See J. M. Keynes, *op. cit.*, Ch. II, and Sir William Beveridge's criticisms of certain passages of this chapter in his address to the British Association in 1923 on Population and Unemployment.

² Their motives were mixed, and differed according to the local political situation. In Hungary the peasants' boycott of Budapest in 1919 had been provoked by their hostility towards the 'Reds'; in Austria it was confused with the hostility of the Catholics towards the Social-Democrats and with the jealousy of the provinces towards the capital; but these motives did not result in action so long as the towns were able to offer the peasant the manufactured articles which he needed in exchange for his agricultural produce, and if the industrialists had maintained their economic ascendancy they would have had little to fear from the suppressed spite of the agrarians.

which had escaped the Bolshevik Revolution, and where the great landowners were still almost as powerful politically as they had been in Russia before 1917, the large estates were passing into the peasants' hands, and it made little difference to the economic result whether the political process were revolutionary violence or parliamentary legislation.¹ In Poland and Bulgaria, the year 1920 saw peasant Governments in power, and M. Stambulsky dreamed of a 'Green International' in which the peasant states of Eastern Europe were to co-operate for their common defence against the Bolshevism of Moscow on the one flank and the Capitalism of London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome on the other. In Italy the Romagnol and Sicilian peasants (sometimes under the bizarre leadership of the clerico-communist 'Black-Reds') were subjecting the larger estates to 'invasions' which were not accompanied by violence only because they were not resisted; and the triumph of the peasant over the industrialist on the European continent was symbolized in international politics by the ascendancy of France and the abasement of Germany. In Europe, Champagne had conquered the Ruhr, and the same movement was making itself felt overseas in the Middle Western Zone of the United States and Canada, where a 'Farmers' Party' was at last girding itself for the parliamentary combat against the middlemen of the towns who had so long stood between the agricultural producers and their markets. This revolt of the countryside had been made possible by a change—whether temporary or permanent—in the balance of bargaining power. The demand of the industrialists for food-stuffs had become keener than the agriculturists' demand for anything that the townsfolk were able at this time to offer them in exchange. Inevitably, the agriculturists were either driving a better bargain or else they were refusing to sell at all, but their action was not, perhaps, entirely determined by 'the haggling of the market'. A long-suppressed resentment at their previous position of economic inferiority was showing itself, at this first opportunity, in an impulse to take some revenge upon the industrialist for his past domination, besides making a profit out of his present distress. In fact, the 'class war' which Industrial Labour had long been urging against Capitalism

¹ See I. L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Rumania*. In 1920 the Venizelist administration began to divide up the *chiftliks* or large estates in North-Eastern Greece, though M. Venizelos's legislation for this purpose was suspended after his fall at the end of the year. The conspicuous exception was Hungary under the 'White' restoration, which sheltered the landlords not only from expropriation but even from their fair share of taxation.

had now broken out between the agrarians and the industrialists as a whole.

At the same time the formerly passive multitudes of India and the Far East were showing an intention to assume a more active economic role. If the people of India *en masse* were to follow the precepts of Mahatma Gandhi, one great market and source of raw materials for Western industry would be closed; while, if the opposite school prevailed, India and China might follow Japan into the industrial field and compete with the industrial countries of the West under conditions which would force these either to sacrifice their standard of living or else to abandon the world market to the cheap labour of their new rivals. Either of these alternative developments would be a serious menace to the material prosperity of Western society, even if the congested populations of India and the Far East did not succeed in enlarging their borders by emigration. In 1920 they were struggling to force an entrance into the land-reserves held by the United States and by the smaller nations of Western origin whose territories bordered on the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. For the time being they were impotent to challenge the policy of exclusion which was being pursued by the nations in possession—supported as they were by the united strength of the American Entente and the British Commonwealth—but the pressure of population upon a territorial vacuum could not be dissipated by a political barrier. The problem was being suppressed but it was not being solved, and the tension was rapidly increasing. On this question there were no divisions in the ranks on either side: Chinese and Japanese Nationalists forgot their quarrel, Mr. Gandhi stood on the same platform as Mr. Shastri, and the Latin-American Republics ranged themselves under the banner of the Monroe Doctrine. On the international horizon of 1920 this was one of the darkest clouds.¹

Happily an international organization for grappling with economic problems on a world-wide scale had been called into action even before the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. The General Conference of the International Labour Organization attached to the League of Nations had held its first meeting at Washington in 1919,² and in discussing the draft of an Eight Hours Convention it had been confronted with the international problems arising from

¹ See Part I B of the *Survey for 1924*.

² The first act of the Conference at this meeting had been to admit Germany and Austria to membership. See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. VI, Part 2, 'The International Labour Section of the Treaties'.

the progress of industrialism in India and Japan. The result had been a compromise, under which the Indian and Japanese representatives on the Conference had accepted a special schedule of working hours per week which was appreciably lower than the existing statutory maximum in either country, while the other members, in return, had waived their demand that the two Asiatic states should enact the Eight Hours Convention immediately. This was a distinct step towards a world-wide standardization of industrial conditions, and every further advance in this direction would tend to diminish the danger which threatened the economic and political peace of the world if the industrialization of India and the Far East were left to take its course without some measure of international control. The International Labour Organization subsequently established its competency in agrarian questions through a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in July 1920 ; and thus, within three years of its foundation, this branch of the League of Nations acquired a status for dealing with the two major economic problems of an international character which had arisen since the War of 1914.

(v) The Foreground

In January, 1920, the attention of Mankind was distracted from the horizon of the international landscape, with its vast, uncertain lights and shadows, by the intricate and perilous foreground through which every person responsible for the welfare of others, from the head of a state to the head of a household, would have to find a path during the weeks and months immediately ahead. To many minds it seemed idle to speculate upon the prospects of the League of Nations, the future of Nationalism and parliamentary government, or the conditions for a *modus vivendi* between Western society and the other civilizations, so long as Western society itself remained in peril of breaking down and relapsing into barbarism.

In 1920 most thoughtful people in the West were troubled, at the back of their minds, by the consciousness of this possibility. Some saw mortal peril in political extravagances like Communism or Fascism, others feared a permanent dislocation of the economic system. Yet, six years before, all these observers would have rejected with incredulity the suggestion that society was exposed to serious danger from any quarter. In 1914 educated persons in the West were, of course, aware that other great civilizations had

gone down to destruction. The fall of the Roman Empire was the familiar background to the history of Western society itself ; and, for a century past, the enterprise of Western archaeologists had been bringing to light, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Crete, Central Asia, and Yucatan, the magnificent remains of civilizations so utterly cut off that their scripts had become extinct and their very names forgotten ; but this *memento mori* which the archaeologist had been holding silently before the eyes of the scientist and the *entrepreneur* had not deeply impressed the Western imagination. The general proposition that not only individuals but societies are mortal might be admitted by the rational Western intellect, but how could this apply in practice to the apparently triumphant vitality of Western civilization on the eve of the War ? At that time the pricks of doubt could be quieted by such simple exercises as opening an atlas and glancing at the territories in which the *Règlement* of the Postal Union was in effective operation. How great a degree of security was implied in an international postal service, and what a vast proportion of the land and water surface of the world was covered by this system of ordered inter-communication ! The extension of law and order, and of all the constructive achievements to which law and order opened the way, had been the mark of the century. India had been reduced to order since 1799, Central Asia since 1864, Tropical Africa since 1880. Compared to these immense conquests of orderly government, its recent collapse in Mexico and China was still regarded, in 1914, as a temporary set-back of no general significance. As for the outer barbarian, he was barely holding his own, with his back to the wall, in a few highlands like the North-West Frontier of India, Kurdistan, Albania, and the Riff, and a few deserts like Central Arabia and the Sahara ; but the pacification of the Caucasus and Turcomania by Russia, and of the Eastern Sudan by Great Britain, had proved that even these natural strongholds of barbarism were not impregnable.

By January, 1920, the picture had changed. If the effective area of the Postal Union were a valid index, the realm of law and order had been seriously diminished ; Mexico and China had been followed into anarchy by Russia and Anatolia ; in Egypt and India the crust of Western administration was quaking ; and these political set-backs to Western civilization in half-assimilated regions were not being redressed by greater military successes against the recalcitrant nomads and mountaineers. The defence of the North-West Frontier of India against a few thousand Waziris and Afridis

was embarrassing the finances of the Indian Empire.¹ The British taxpayer was faced with the prospect of an equal burden on the Kurdish frontier of 'Iraq. Farther westward, the Italians were still being baffled by the desert hinterland of Tripoli and the Spaniards by the Riff. The sole apparent exception was the progress of the French in the Atlas, where Marshal Lyautey had resumed a task of pacification as formidable as Russia's undertakings in the Caucasus during the nineteenth century. Lyautey, wiser in his generation than the generals of Nicholas I, was working towards his objective by a skilful combination of military force with diplomacy; yet, in view of her falling birth-rate and the figure of her recent casualties on the European battle-fields, France could less easily afford to spend her 'man power' on colonial adventures than any of the other surviving Empires. At a time when French White troops were working their way into the fastnesses of the Atlas, French Black troops were garrisoning the line of the Rhine; while beyond the Atlantic, in the United States, the influx of White immigrants from Europe had been replaced, since the outbreak of the War, by an internal migration of the Negro population from the Gulf States to the industrial cities of the North. The barbarian, admitted within the borders, was working his way towards the heart of the civilized world, but the barbarian was not the greatest danger to civilization. A society, like an organism, is able to inflict more deadly injuries upon itself than it can suffer from any external agency, and for six years the energies of Western society had been devoted to self-devastation.

The scene of this devastation was Western Europe, the home of Western civilization and the focus of the world's economic activity. Before the War of 1914 Western Europe had been importing food-stuffs and raw materials from the rest of the world and exporting manufactures and emigrants. The balance of this immense traffic had been so favourable to her that she had been able to raise the standard of living and increase the numbers of her population simultaneously and still to save a margin of her annual profits for capital investments in Eastern Europe, Russia, and overseas; but her extraordinary prosperity (and, indeed, her life itself) had depended upon the regular working of an economic organization as elaborate and as delicate as the machinery of a steel works or a cotton mill. From 1914 to 1919 Western Europe had still focused

¹ Compare the rising cost of defending the barbarian frontiers of the Roman Empire during the first four centuries after Christ.

in herself the economic activity of the world, but the direction of this activity had been reversed by a fatal derangement in the action of the gigantic machine. The burning fiery furnace which had been pouring out molten wealth for half a century had suddenly become a vortex of destruction, and at the beginning of 1920, when the flames were dying down, it was becoming possible to estimate how much of the wealth and happiness of Western Europe had been consumed.

The sacrifice had been exacted both in material and in human kind, and in each category the losses were partly visible and partly invisible. The destruction of human values, for example, could not be measured by the casualty returns of the various belligerent countries. In addition to the killed, wounded, and shell-shocked combatants, there were the victims of blockade and famine who had perished and the far greater numbers who had been enfeebled permanently in various degrees, and the victims of unemployment arising from the interruption of emigration and of international trade. Similarly, the visible destruction of material values in the war zones of Belgium, Northern France, and Eastern Poland was vastly augmented by the deterioration of plant over-driven with insufficient lubricants, or of land over-cultivated with insufficient phosphates; by the forcible transfer of cattle, minerals, rolling-stock, shipping, machinery, securities, and other valuables from one community to another, both during hostilities and after the Armistice; and by the unequal depreciation of the various European currencies in comparison with the American dollar, which was hindering the resumption of commercial relations. More serious, however, for the future than all this destruction of life and property was the psychological devastation which it reflected, for this malady of the soul threatened to hinder society from throwing its surviving energies into the urgent task of reconstruction. Symptoms of nervous derangement were apparent in almost all the great communities of the world, though they differed in form and degree according to the differences of experience during the past six years. Germany was stunned by defeat; France was embittered by the barrenness of victory; Eastern Europe and the Islamic world were distracted by the fever of national awakening; Russia was possessed by Bolshevism; India and China were shaken to their depths by intellectual and political upheavals; Japan was intoxicated by imperial ambitions; even the United States was partly paralysed by a nervous horror of the Old World; and the British Commonwealth

was staggering under the burden of Atlas. Almost all the international problems left behind by the War were weighing upon her shoulders. The disturbance of the world's economic equilibrium was producing the malady of unemployment in the British Isles. The general tendency towards political devolution was raising those difficult constitutional problems which had always been latent in the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions; the progress of Nationalism was arousing violent revolts against the *status quo* in Ireland, India, and Egypt; and the contact of civilizations, which was perhaps the greatest of all movements in the contemporary world, was largely working itself out within the boundaries of the British Empire. In the Caliphate Movement British statesmanship was confronted with the issue between Western civilization and Islam, while the struggle of the Indian emigrant for the right to settle in Kenya or South Africa or Australia on an equal footing with the White Man made the British Empire one of the main theatres of the racial conflict between ~~civilized~~ peoples of different colour for the possession of the still unoccupied spaces of the world.

Thus the British Commonwealth had a greater stake than any other community in the stubborn and doubtful battle of these four years which followed the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles—a battle not fought by states with material weapons, like the war of 1914, but waged, within each nation, and within the souls of individuals, between opposing states of mind. There was a state of grace which triumphed in the Washington Conference and in the financial reconstruction of Austria; and there was another state which nearly plunged Europe into war again in September 1923 and which prolonged for four years the sordid tragedy of Reparation. The battle was fought out gradually over the vast field of international relations which the following volume attempts to survey, and at the end of the year 1923, with which the volume closes, the issue was still uncertain.

Tantum spirantes aequo certamine bellum
Magnis inter se de rebus cernere certant.